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Abstract
The repercussions of September 11, 2011 have been felt worldwide and have
drastically changed the paradigm in which countries operate today. They have
justified two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and incursion into sovereign territories in
pursuit of terrorists and insurgents. As insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan have
continued to thrive, Coalition countries have been forced to adjust their approach to
defeating non-conventional forces that they are largely not trained to fight. This has
resulted in tactics that utilize what scholars have called “Smart Power,” a mixture of
both hard and soft power. Foreign aid and its distribution in COIN operations has
sparked a major debate amongst scholars, soldiers and aid industry workers as to who
should distribute foreign aid and what relationship the military and aid workers
should have. I hypothesize that the traditional relationship between aid workers and
the military in the distribution of foreign aid in COIN operations is inadequate and
dysfunctional. I will argue that while both parties are important vehicles in the
distribution of aid, because of the lack of coordination between them, COIN has been
much less effective. Therefore, this thesis aims to study the ways in which aid is
distributed by aid workers and the military, in order to uncover evidence to support
my thesis and draw conclusions as to what are the best practices in aid distribution,
when dealing with insurgencies and winning hearts and minds. Traditionally, military
and aid workers have tried to operate separately from one another, in order to
maintain impartiality. However, COIN has called for aid workers to work with troops
to implement development projects and in some cases troops have been responsible
themselves for implementing projects. This has resulted in protests from the
development community, arguing that soldiers are unqualified to distribute aid and
separation of the military and aid workers is essential to security. Using Iraq and
Afghanistan as case studies, this thesis looks at how foreign aid has been utilized in
COIN. In the conclusion, based on my research, I make recommendations for ways in
which countries can improve distribution of foreign aid in the COIN context.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Modern visions of war conjure images of Allied troops landing on the beaches
of Normandy or fighting in the jungles of Vietnam. However, just as important in
winning wars are soft power tactics, in conjunction with hard power, to gain a desired
outcome. As the West, and in particular the United States, has become dominant in
conventional warfare, its enemies have been forced to resort to irregular guerilla
warfare in an attempt to exploit weaknesses in mobility and public support for
ongoing engagement. Today in the Afghan and Iraq wars, soft power in the form of
foreign aid has emerged as a vital component of efforts to defeat insurgents and win
the hearts and minds of the local population.
However, arguments rage today over how this power should be wielded in
Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. In the “US Government Counterinsurgency
Guide,” published in 2009 by the Department of State, insurgency is defined as
“…the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political
control of a region.”1 As the US has struggled with its efforts to install legitimate
governments in Afghanistan and Iraq, insurgencies have been one of the biggest
bottlenecks to security and to the struggle by national and local governments to
gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the native populations. One of the principal debates
that has arisen is over how development aid should be used in COIN efforts and by
what methods it should be distributed. The United States has spent billions of dollars
a year in development and aid to stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq, in the face of
insurgents using irregular warfare. The debate over development aid and COIN has
become especially pertinent, as the United States is having to make very serious
budgetary choices as the country deals with a national debt that has grown to an
1

US State Department, “U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide,” US State Department, January
2009, accessed via www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/pmppt.
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estimated $14 trillion and a global financial crisis with no end in sight.2 This is
coupled with a global examination of development partner engagement in developing
countries and the effectiveness of aid dollars. Because of the massive monetary costs,
the potential loss of life during COIN campaigns, and the repercussions these actions
have in an increasingly interconnected and globalized world, the use of development
aid in COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan deserves more attention. I hypothesize that the
traditional relationship between aid workers and the military in the distribution of
foreign aid in COIN operations is inadequate and dysfunctional. I will argue that
while both parties are important vehicles in the distribution of aid, because of the lack
of coordination between them, COIN has been much less effective. Therefore, this
thesis aims to study the ways in which aid is distributed by aid workers and the
military, in order to uncover evidence to support my thesis and draw conclusions as to
what are the best practices in aid distribution, when dealing with insurgencies and
winning hearts and minds.
In what the Bush administration called the “third pillar” of the US national
Security Strategy and one of the elements of what the Obama administration has
referred to as “smart power,” aid has become central to US foreign policy in the post
9/11 world. In his 2010 National Security Strategy, Obama stated that the United
States would pursue “…a development budget that more deliberately reflects our
policies and our strategy, not sector earmarks; and ensure that our policy instruments
are aligned in support of development objectives.”3 The strategic nature of this
development assistance is demonstrated in the COIN doctrine and begs the question
of how aid can best be distributed in order to defeat the insurgencies. In order for the

2

United States Treasury, http://www.usdebtclock.org/, US Treasury, Accessed April 19, 2011.
Barack Obama, “National Security Strategy,” The White House, Washington D.C., May 2010,
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distribution of aid to be effective, the mechanisms and policies employed must be
justified and backed up with results.
Additionally, aid distribution in Afghanistan and Iraq is important to the
United States’ support of democracies around the world. As the Obama
administration continues to confront insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan it has
reiterated its commitments. “… America will persist in promoting peace among
different peoples and believes that democracy and individual empowerment and need
not come at the expense of cherished identities.”4 However, some fear the ability of
the United States to wield smart power as it has in the past is waning. The continuing
financial crisis has strained budgets and considering the foreign aid budget is only one
percent, any budgetary cuts could have major effects. In a nod to the importance of
spending every dollar of aid effectively, Chairwoman Kay Granger of the House
appropriations subcommittee overseeing foreign affairs, argued spending must be
prioritized to reflect national security interests and furthermore, must stand up to the
scrutiny of the public.5
The end of the cold war has changed the dynamics of relations between states
and given rise to a new group of non-traditional actors that threaten security within
states and entire regions throughout the world. The Cold War was led by two distinct
national powers, the Soviet Union and United States, which created a relatively stable
bi-polar world. The current insurgents are characterized as more fluid with many
factions and de-centralized authority, and in the case of Al Qaeda, united by ideology.
This has made identifying the enemy and negotiating with them more difficult.

4
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In the particular cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, because the enemy is so
difficult to identify, the use of foreign aid has become all the more important in
convincing the populations, among which the insurgents operate, that the
governments offer a better alternative. This is done by channeling aid through five
main categories: bilateral development aid, civilian security aid, military aid,
humanitarian aid, multilateral development aid and political/strategic aid.6
Additionally, but perhaps most importantly, the creation of the Iraq and Afghanistan
Reconstruction Fund has skewed the statistics on foreign aid because of the sheer size
of the packages each fiscal year. Of the $104 billion provided since 2002, $57 billion
has been channeled through the Department of Defense (DoD) budget.7 It is the large
amount of development aid under the DoD’s control and the infringement upon
traditional humanitarian space that has sparked debates in the nongovernmental
organizations (NGO) and aid worker community.
During the Cold War foreign aid was a tool that the United States used to gain
influence and stem the spread of Communism. Aid demonstrated the good will of the
United States, as well as the prosperity that it enjoyed as a result of its ideology, but it
also served as an incentive to others to adopt the ideology of the United States.
However, with the end of the Cold War many donor nations and leaders fell into what
in retrospect could be seen as a false sense of security. To some, the fall of
Communism seemed to highlight the supremacy of liberal democratic societies and
those that had formed in former republics of the Soviet Union were a testament to the
peoples’ desire for them. This resulted in significant cut backs in aid funding in the
1990s. Francis Fukuyama went so far as to question whether the end of communism
signaled “The End of History?” or the triumph of the final form of government to be
6

Cur Tarnoff and Marian Leonardo Lawson. “Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of US Programs
and Policies,” Congressional Research Service, February 10, 2011, pp. 4-7.
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Ibid., p. 10.
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adopted by man. Liberal economic policies were seen to be the solution for many of
the economic and social problems that plagued parts of the globe.
While the end of the Cold War brought a wave of nations embracing
democratic reform, the reality is that liberal democracies were, in fact, not embraced
by all, and even developing democracies are still mired in extreme poverty. This calls
into question whether liberal democracies are even desirable by large segments of the
global population. In the Middle East, the Balkans and parts of Asia, autocratic
regimes still hold power over populations lacking basic freedoms and economic
opportunities. While the Arab Spring brought about popular uprisings calling for
democracy and has succeeded in several nations, there is still debate over whether the
final product of these movements will result in true democracies or more authoritarian
regimes with religious fundamentalist leanings.
In the case of Afghanistan, the country has suffered decades of war, been ruled
by a totalitarian regime and suffered from extreme poverty. The ruling Taliban was
notorious for their human rights violations and enforcement of Sharia law and still
today, as an insurgency, it has been successful in forming a shadow government in
parts of the country. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World
Factbook Afghanistan has the world’s second highest infant mortality rate at 151.5
deaths/1000. The life expectancy in Afghanistan is 44.65 years, giving the country an
overall ranking of 221 out of 223 nations. Only 28.5 percent of the population is
literate, with the average citizen attending school for 8 years. Additionally, a 2008
estimate put Afghanistan’s unemployment rate at 35 percent.8 This has caused not
only the structural decimation of Afghanistan, but also damaged the fabric of Afghan
culture and civil society, in turn creating a society constantly at war with itself.

8
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The 24-year rule of Saddam Hussein left Iraq with a deeply divided society.
Stoking ethnic tensions, Saddam put power into the hands of the Sunni minority and
disenfranchised the Shiites, while massacring Kurd Separatists. The 1980’s and 90’s
brought war with Iran and later war with a coalition led by the United States, causing
damage to the Country’s infrastructure and national defense. United Nations
resolution 661 placed stringent economic sanctions on Iraq and in turn pushed the
country to the verge of bankruptcy and major humanitarian crisis. While Iraq does
not suffer from poverty to the same degree as Afghanistan, years of crippling
economic sanctions, autocratic rule, the US invasion, insurgencies and sectarian
violence have made for a situation in which the country experiences 15 percent
unemployment.9 Furthermore, continued violence and insecurity from suicide
bombings have made recovery and achieving security within the country a slow and
arduous process. The invasion of 2003 represented for insurgents and terrorist groups
an opportunity to challenge the United States. While officially the duty of
maintaining security within the country has been handed over to Iraqi security forces,
the United States until recently maintained a significant military presence within the
country, creating resentment.
The importance of stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan cannot be understated. At
stake are Iraqi and Afghan lives, stability of the region, American strategic interests
and American image and prestige around the world. The perceived failures in
Afghanistan have caused the American public to question the feasibility of a mission
that was overwhelmingly supported at its inception. The struggling mission in Iraq
has also damaged American prestige abroad, as the mission failed to garner support at
the outset and was not supported by many allies and regional powers. These factors

9
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make studying how aid is distributed of utmost importance. American power comes
not only from its military strength, but also from its ability to persuade and
demonstrate its good will and development aid stands to play a major role in this. By
helping to bring security to the region, the United States stands to gain not only allies,
but also credibility throughout the world.
The events of 9/11 served as a sobering reminder of the gulf that still exists
between many members of Muslim nations and the west. This gulf is not only
economic, but also in clashing understandings of issues such as rights and governance
in an increasingly globalized world. It not only exists in peoples nation of origin, but
as emigration due to economic circumstances increases, immigrant communities that
do not integrate often times retain their native understandings of rights and
governance, causing strains in relations with communities of adopted nations. What is
not in doubt is that these attacks changed the dynamic of relations between the United
States, its allies and enemies.
“The War on Terror,” is a somewhat ambiguous term that has justified action
in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and other regions throughout the globe. To resolve
these new conflicts, it is important not only to use hard power, but also soft power in
the form of aid. Using hard power the United States and its allies have had success in
killing insurgents. However, in a guerilla war in which insurgents operate amongst
the communities, civilian casualties and destruction of property is inevitable. Without
the use of soft power the United States and its allies will simply be seen as
destructive. Although not the entire population will be won over, a majority must
view the war as bringing about something more than death and destruction. This
thesis therefore explores the usefulness of development aid and how it is best
distributed when in conjunction with a counterinsurgency strategy. It begins with a
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review that will look at the pertinent literature relating to aid effectiveness, COIN and
smart power. It will then look at different methods of aid distribution in Iraq and
Afghanistan, to identify the most effective ways to distribute aid.
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Chapter 2: Research Design, Analytical Framework
This thesis hypothesizes that when fighting insurgencies the use of a foreign
aid strategy that is coordinated by both donors and the military will more likely
produce results than a strategy of non-coordinated aid. However, military partners
and development partners are often at odds. Therefore, I propose the best way to
ensure aid effectiveness is to find ways for the military and other development
partners to coordinate their efforts.
My hypothesis is based on the following observations. First, insurgencies have
complex roots. As opposed to national armies that are under the command of a
government in power, insurgents grow from the population and communities that do
not support the government. This can be a result of anywhere from a lack of
legitimacy, inability to provide services or lack of social justice.10 This makes
winning the support of the population that the insurgents operate amongst as essential
to any solution.
Second, aid serves as one of the many tools that governments use to project
power and comes in many forms that serve different purposes. Today, development
aid is key to the counterinsurgency (COIN) mission taking place in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Foreign aid can be divided into five primary types of aid: bilateral
development aid, economic assistance supporting US political and security goals,
humanitarian aid, multilateral economic contributions, and military aid.11 Analysis of
budget appropriations over time shows that major events like the Cold War, antinarcotics campaigns, and 9/11 have had major effects on the amount of money the
United States sends abroad. With the end of the Cold War in the 1990s foreign aid
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Ben Connable, “The End of an Insurgency: What President Obama Can Learn From Peru, Angola
and Colombia,” Foreign Affairs, September 20, 2010, accessed at
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declined to an all time low, because much of the aid had been spent on anticommunist initiatives. This decline in aid reflected a major change in US policy and
the lack of “big idea” policy objectives after years of predominantly channeling aid
towards one overall initiative.12 However, since 9/11 aid budgets have increased to
levels not seen since the Cold War. Aid allocations in 2010 totaled $39.4 billion
dollars, the highest levels of foreign aid since 1985.13 Therefore, although aid
decreased after the Cold War, the post 9/11 environment has made development aid
all the more important in helping the US to promote democracy, development and
good governance. The distribution of aid now aims to achieve five main objectives:
Peace and Security; Investing in People; Governing Justly and Democratically;
Economic Growth and Humanitarian Assistance.14 This is relatively clear-cut in nonconflict situations. However, in Iraq and Afghanistan, vigorous debates are taking
place as to how aid should be distributed and what the relationship should be between
aid organizations, governments and the military.
Since the attacks of 9/11, bilateral and multilateral development and
humanitarian assistance have increased significantly and now make up more than 50
percent of all foreign aid. Bilateral aid alone accounted for 34 percent of the budget
and more at certain times in the past decade. Largely administered by the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), it is used to promote
economic progress and social stability in developing countries, health and education
initiatives, as well as well-known programs like the Peace Corps and the new
Millennium Challenge Corporation programs. Aid is also used to provide assistance
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during natural disasters.15 Development assistance allows the United States to
exercise soft power and create new markets for US goods in the future. In the case of
counterinsurgency, this type of aid can win the hearts and minds of the nationals of
the country, while providing concrete economic and social benefits.
This increase in development aid is juxtaposed against the decline in the last
decade of spending on military aid. Toward the end of the Cold War military
spending increased 42 percent in 1984, because of the Reagan administrations efforts
to counter the Soviet threat.16 However, with its conclusion and the rise of new issues
such as drug trafficking and terrorism, scholars began to study what the root of these
problems were and many identified poverty and bad governance as the main culprits.
States in which drug trafficking was rampant and terrorists were found, tended to be
also wracked by poverty and corrupt governance.17 The events of 9/11 further
highlighted what many believed to be the correlation between poverty, terrorism, and
state insecurity. With this in mind, many policy makers advocated an emphasis on
the concepts of human security, good governance, and development as key to dealing
with security issues.18 Consequently, development budgets increased while foreign
military aid decreased significantly. In comparison to Cold War budgets, which
allocated 42 percent towards military aid, the 2011 budget calls for an allocation of 10
percent.19 To offset the loss of military aid in the annual foreign aid package, the
Department of Defense (DoD) has increased its share of development spending. The
overall increase in the amount of money dedicated to development demonstrates the
adoption of human security as central in US foreign policy.
15
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It is the role of the DoD in providing aid, that has become a much-debated
issue. From fiscal year 1998 to 2005 the DoD’s percentage of Official Development
Aid (ODA) increased from 3.5 percent to 22 percent, while USAID’s ODA decreased
from 65 percent to less than 40 Percent.20 These funds are used to pay for
development projects in support of the governments COIN mission.
What is at the root of the debate about aid and COIN is how and by whom it is
distributed, and whether it is effective in achieving its goals of defeating the
insurgents and winning over the native population. Therefore in order to support my
hypothesis, I will proceed as follows: I will examine the COIN operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan and compare military aid programs to those by the aid community
outside of military programs. The latter will include aid distributed by independent
NGOs, government programs and multilateral organizations. Such a comparison will
allow me to gauge whether COIN initiated development projects or projects
independent of the COIN mission have been more successful and make a case for my
suggestions regarding coordination. I will judge effectiveness by acceptance of
development of projects by the communities, overall success of projects and the
prevalence of insurgents in communities targeted by development projects.
In order to support my hypothesis I will study the distribution of aid by the US
military in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to judge what are the strengths and
weaknesses of their practices. I will juxtapose the militaries practices against those of
organizations that operate independently of the military. These will include aid
distributed by independent NGOs, government programs and multilateral
organizations. By gathering data from an array of organizations independent from the

20

Kaysie Brown and Stewart Patrick, The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the
DoD’s Expanding Role, Center for Global Development, Working Paper no. 131, November 2007, p.
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military I will be able to make more informed judgments about organizations that
operate in different contexts.
2.1.
Theoretical Literature on Counterinsurgencies and Development
Smart Power
In the study of military tactics the use of “hard power” or force has been
researched as one of the primary means for winning wars. With the United States
engaged in the “War on Terror” and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there has, however,
been a revival of academic research on soft power as well as hard.
In 2004 Suzanne Nossel authored a piece in Foreign Policy magazine calling
for what she felt was a need to respond to the growing militarism in American foreign
policy. In this article she formulates the concept of a cohesive policy based on the
exercise of both hard and soft power to more adequately achieve policy objectives.
This she refers to as “smart power.”21
Nossel sees smart power as a response to the distinct change in international
relations. “The unparalleled strength of the United States, the absence of great-power
conflict, the fears aroused by September 11th, and growing public skepticism of the
Bush administration's militarism have created a political opening for a cogent,
visionary alternative to the president's foreign policy.”22 Nossel goes on to argue for
the adoption of a liberal internationalism that uses an equally weighted combination
of trade, foreign aid, diplomacy and the spread of American values.23 It is this
combination of tools that the Obama administration has adopted as part of their COIN
efforts.
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In large part this is driven by liberal ideals adopted by much of the west.
These ideals are rooted in what Emanuel Kant called the “Perpetual Peace” and is
today called the Democratic or Liberal Peace Theory. This is based on the idea that
democratic states do not fight each other because of shared rights that include
freedom from arbitrary authority, referred to as a “negative freedom,” “positive
freedoms,” which are “those rights necessary to protect and promote the capacity and
opportunity for freedom” and democratic participation, which guarantees the previous
rights are not infringed upon.24 After the Cold War ended scholars like Francis
Fukuyama hypothesized that a wave of liberalism would bring about peace based on
these shared principles of democratic ideals, individual rights, rule of law and free
trade.25 This has been challenged in the wake of the struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan
and scholarly work that argues factors like population, regional affiliations and size of
economies, play major roles in the likelihood of states going to war.26 The aftermath
of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Arab spring will serve as a further test of
this theory as more democracies emerge in the Arab region.
Central to the US and its allies spreading these liberal values will be the use of
smart power, incorporating development aid and diplomacy as central to official US
military policy and Counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. Economic aid has even been
referred to as a “weapons system” by the US military, in a handbook that gives
soldiers and commanders proper guidelines on how to properly spend money and
which types of projects.27 Joseph Nye argued that traditionally, the strength of a great
24
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25
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power was made manifest in its ability to wage successful wars.28 This ability was
attributed to a large power’s control of land, natural resources, military technology
and human resources, among other things. This held true for much of history.
However, many scholars have debated whether interdependence in global
politics, the world economy, cultures, and societies, have made waging traditional
wars a more costly and difficult effort than before. Transnational groups invest large
amounts of money in countries around the world developing industries, building
infrastructure, extracting resources, and growing economies. Because of this
investment and the impetus on governments to protect them, countries have become
more interconnected in order to foster these relationships, trade and build economies.
It is argued that after World War II increased trade between Germany and France
created an interconnected relationship that fostered peace. Oneal and Russett argued
that the increasing economic interdependence “…reinforces structural constraints and
liberal norms by creating transnational ties that encourage accommodation rather than
conflict.” 29 Furthermore, “…trade is a mutually beneficial interaction, giving each
party stake in the economic well-being of the other- and in avoiding militarized
disputes.”30 For example, while not all democratic and liberal, countries in the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) claim to have more than
80% of all petroleum reserves, or more than 1 trillion barrels of oil.31 While other
organizations set these estimates as low as 727 billion barrels, the interdependence of
the sellers of this oil and the consumers is real.32 Additionally, transnational
28

Joseph Nye. “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, No. 80, (Autumn 1990), p. 154.
John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, “The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy,
Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Jun.,
1997), p. 269.
30
Ibid., p. 270.
31
OPEC, “OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Reserves 2010,” OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin
2010/2011 edition, accessed at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm
32
Energy Information Administration, “World Proved Reserves of Oil and Natural Gas, Mot Recent
Estimates,” accessed at http://www.eia.gov/emeu/international/reserves.html.
29

18

companies extract these resources and are dependent on good relations between
countries in order to turn a profit. These factors in turn have forced states to utilize
“soft power” in order to keep good relations, but have not eradicated the option of war
between states.
Redefining Security to include Human Security
The end of the Cold War brought about a shift in relations between states
throughout the globe, but it also sparked debates as to how development and security
would be viewed in the future. During the Cold War the US and its allies had
programs that were focused on Human Security, seen in initiatives like the Alliance
for Progress, which called for a “…a vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in
magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people
for homes, work and land, health and schools.”33 While these types of programs
highlighted human security, some critics felt there was still too large a focus on the
territorial security of the states. Politically speaking, military threats to a nation are
simple for the average citizen to see as a clear threat to their security. Richard Ullman
argued that this way of thinking is misguided because it neglects security threats from
within a nations border and other non-military threats.34 Many saw the post-Cold
War as an opportunity to rethink security and development.
The authors of the 1994 United nations Human Development Report (HDR)
wished to focus more global attention poverty and accountability by creating a new
paradigm that shifted focus from state and nuclear security, which had preoccupied
states during the Cold War, to human security. Critics felt that the focus on
sovereignty of states had neglected the security of citizens; especially in developing
33
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countries. Instead wealth and advancements had been concentrated in the hands of the
elite leaving large portions of the population disenfranchised. Often development aid
had been misused to enrich leaders. The United States and the west had continuously
supported corrupt regimes in the name of stopping the spread of communism, but this
in turn bred corruption and violence. In 1993 42 countries were involved in 52 major
conflicts, while 37 were experiencing political violence. 65 of the 79 countries were
in the developing world.35 Furthermore, old ethnic tensions, which were largely
suppressed during the cold war, manifested themselves in the form of civil wars.
Former dictators fell by the wayside and power struggles ensued. This highlighted
the inadequacy of the development agenda.
The definition of human security is subjective and highlights the complexity
of the issue. The new agenda argues that human security has two aspects that can be
identified, the first being, “…safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and
repression.” and second, “…protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the
patterns of daily life-whether in homes, in jobs or in communities.”36 Achieving
human security is largely based around the concept of achieving sustainable and
people-centered development, as opposed to development strategies that “will
respond to emergency relief. Or to fitful policy interventions”37 The overview of the
Human Development Report states:
Sustainable human development is development that not only
generates economic growth but also distributes its benefits equitably;
that regenerates the environment rather than destroying it; that
empowers people rather than marginalizing them. It is development
that gives priority to the poor, enlarging their choices and opportunities
and providing for their participation in decisions that affect their lives.
It is development that is pro-people, pro-nature,
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pro-jobs and pro-women.38

Defining Human security represents a challenge for scholars and the development
community. Some proponents see a vague definition of human security as being
useful in that it allows for use by a broad array of groups to chip away at the
traditional security paradigm. 39 They argue that issues like health, environment,
migration and access to natural resources threaten security and therefore should be
included because they are as much drivers of insecurity as are military threats.40
Other Scholars others have argued that too vague a definition risks the term not
having any meaning at all. Roland Paris argues that Human Security is like
“Sustainable Development” in that everyone supports it, but it is very hard to define.41
This has lead some to attempt to define human security and more importantly find
ways in which the concept can be incorporated into actual policy.
In their book The Ultimate Weapon is No Weapon, Shannon D. Beebe and
Mary Kaldor define human security as personal security or security from violence and
the prevention of violence by mitigating the conditions that lead to violence.42 This
definition, the authors argue, necessitates coordination in war situations between the
development community and the military in providing humanitarian space for
development to take place.
Beebe and Kaldor are careful to make the distinction between COIN strategy
and human security. "Counterinsurgency is not actually human security, however the
term is defined. In counterinsurgency, human security, or population security, is a
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tactic, not a strategy.”43 In contrast, human security seeks to prevent situations from
escalating into violence.44 It is in the areas that violence is absent development is able
to take place. By developing institutions that promote good governance and law and
order, based on human rights rather than the laws of war, a civil society is able to take
root.45
Beebe and Kaldor argue for the integration of military and civilian personnel
in achieving development goals. Traditionally rules of humanitarianism are based on
the concept of aid workers operating in humanitarian space respected by two sides in
a conflict. Today, they argue, these spaces are not as respected and the only places
that provide security are military bases. The human security paradigm would create
spaces that would allow for both security and development to take place.46 This
concept of integration has sparked an outcry from throughout the development
community as many have argued the opposite, that aid has been securitized or
militarized. In a joint report by more than 20 aid organizations working in
Afghanistan, they claim that the work of soldiers and civilians and NGOs protected
by armed guards has compromised the relationship of aid agencies providing
assistance and development, and the military providing security.47 With or without
actual coordination between aid organizations and the military, a common
understanding of roles is necessary to deliver effective aid. Continued lack of
agreement creates inefficiencies and can result in a lack of dialogue between parties
that work in the same space.
Development Commitments and Aid Effectiveness
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The end of the Cold War brought new challenges to the international
community as priorities shifted and new challenges were confronted on multiple
levels. The Cold War had provided security in some measure, as nations and their
leaders were propped up primarily by either the United States or the Soviet Union,
depending on the political ideology to which a nation subscribed. With the fall of the
Soviet Union, many nations were left to fend for themselves and intrastate power
struggles became more common as decades-old internal problems between religious
and ethnic groups and challenges to governance came to a head.48 Additionally, the
distribution of aid saw a significant change, as donors called for a new paradigm of
engagement in developing countries. Along with shifting priorities there was a call
for more effective distribution of development aid, which in turn caused a change in
the way aid is distributed.
166 countries and International Organizations adopted the Paris Declaration
on Aid Effectiveness, on March 2, 2005, in reaction to a call for countries to change
the strategies and criteria for aid distribution. The Millennium Development Goals,
ten development goals to be achieved by 2015, were a pre-cursor and reaction to the
grinding poverty that affects a huge portion of the world’s population. The Paris
Declaration has since acted as a set of guidelines by which countries have agreed to
abide, in order to engage in countries most effectively. “We, Ministers of developed
and developing countries… resolve to take far reaching and monitorable actions to
reform the ways we deliver and manage aid as we look ahead to the UN five- year
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review of the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) later this year.”49
Central to the Paris Declaration are five commitments based on past
experiences and applied in context. The commitments are to ownership, alignment,
harmonization, managing for results and mutual accountability.50 While the Paris
Declaration is non-binding, it has put pressure on donors to make aid effective and
has forced them to allow developing countries to decide how development will
proceed in their countries. Commitments to the aid effectiveness paradigm were
further solidified at the Accra Agenda for Action on September 2-4, 2008 in Accra
Ghana. At this meeting, development partners and developing countries reviewed the
progress made in achieving the goals set in The Paris Declaration and called for
further country ownership of development, the building of more effective and
inclusive partnerships and delivering and accounting for development results.51
The result of adopting these principles has been mixed as some development
partners have had more success than others in following the commitments. In 2011,
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) sponsored a
report that evaluated the success of development partners implementing the Paris
Declaration from 2005-2010 in 78 countries that received a combined $70 billion and
results were mixed. Out of all the 13 targets to be met in 2010, only one, Strengthen
capacity by co-ordinated support”, was met.52 While significant progress was made
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in attempting to achieve the others, development partners continue to struggle in
meeting their commitments.
The struggle for countries to follow the Paris Declaration commitments is in
large part owed to the struggles and debates of how to engage in fragile states. The
2011 World Development Report highlights the fact that 1.5 billion people today live
in countries that experience chronic violence both political and criminal in nature,
including violence resulting from organized crime, trafficking and terrorism.53
Furthermore, the problem of repeated cycles of violence plague the majority of
conflict affected countries, with 90% having already having experienced a civil war in
the last 30 years. The mechanisms of the modern international system were based
largely around fighting national armies. Much of the violence coming from irregular
forces is financed through illicit crimes.54
These statistics do not only have an effect upon the people of these nations,
but also have major repercussions for nations bordering fragile states and those
around the world. The existence of instability and violence because of factors such as
crime and poor governance in a country results in mass migration internally and
across borders, sowing chaos in entire regions. The end of 2009 saw globally a total
of 42 million people displaced from their homes due to violence. This included 15
million people forced to flee across borders and 27 million internally displaced
people.55 This in turn places stresses on the neighboring countries both politically and
economically. Furthermore, illicit crimes to finance operations, increases the drug
trade around the world, which in turn fuels violence.56 The complexity of engaging in
fragile states has been recognized; however the major debate that remains is how to
53

The World Bank, “The World Development Report 2011: Conflict Security and Development” The
World Bank, 2011, accessed at http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/ p. 1.
54
Ibid, pp. 2-5.
55
Ibid, p. 61.
56
Ibid, p. 222.

25

engage properly. These debates inevitably bring up the role of development aid and
that of the military, and questions of how and who should be implementing aid
projects.
In 2007 OECD countries committed to Principles for Good International
Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, which recognize the need for additional
guidance when operating in fragile states. These include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Take context as the starting point
Do no harm
Focus on state building as the central objective
Prioritize prevention
Recognize the links between political, security and development objectives
Promote non- discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies
Align with local priorities in different ways and different context
Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors
Act fast… but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance
Avoid pockets of exclusion57

While OECD countries have adopted these rules in principle, implementation of the
rules has been less than consistent. Many of the countries that have committed to
these principles face pressures relating to strategic national interests and security
objectives that they feel are not adequately addressed.
The result of these pressures is seen in the actions of some countries in fragile
states. These countries argue that violence in communities causes insecurity and
therefore aid should be targeted differently, specifically, in order to bring security and
in the case of the COIN mission, to win hearts and minds. The US military published
a COIN manual in 2006 that calls for the military to build or assist in the building of
roads, schools and hospitals, specifically in conflict zones affected by insurgents, in
order to provide security and secure the hearts and minds of the local populace.58
Many have seen this as a militarization of aid that focuses on principles other than
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those agreed upon in 2007 at the OECD conference on Principles for Good
International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations. They claim that this
engagement violates commitments like staying engaged and avoiding pockets of
exclusion. In contrast, COIN proponents argue that the security situation dictates the
type of engagement at the time. “COIN requires Soldiers and Marines to be ready to
fight and to build- depending on the security situation and a variety of other
factors.”59 Because of the fluid nature of COIN operations and the focus on winning
hearts and minds, the ability to follow the prescribed OECD principles is made more
difficult.
COIN efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq that have focused on QUICK Impact
projects in areas that are insecure, while avoiding areas that are more poor, but stable.
For example, Helmand province receives an estimated $285 per capita. In contrast,
the more secure province of Takhar receives $43 per capita.60 A paper sponsored by
multiple aid organizations, including Oxfam, Afghanaid, Care and Norwegian
Refugee Council, Ashley Jackson makes the argument that there is too much focus by
nations on winning hearts and minds as opposed to solving the problems that are at
the root of poverty and conflict. “Development projects implemented with military
money or through military-dominated structures aim to achieve fast results but are
often poorly executed, inappropriate and do not have sufficient community
involvement to make them sustainable.”61 However, the military is at odds with this
viewpoint, as demonstrated with their QUICK Impact projects designed to make
short-term, quick gains.
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The embracing of development aid as a carrot for winning hearts and minds
was furthered with the publishing of the “Commander’s Guide to Money as a
Weapons System,” making clear the governments’ intentions of using development
aid to win the war. “Coalition money is defeating COIN targets without creating
collateral damage, by motivating antigovernment forces to cease lethal and nonlethal
operations, by creating and providing jobs along with other forms of financial
assistance to the indigenous population, and by restoring or creating vital
infrastructure.”62 This document lays out the different funds available to troops for
and the necessary protocol for engagement, which focus on loose rules to be followed
and that are largely under the discretion of commanders.63 Many aid organizations
argue that as the COIN manual has called for increasing collaboration between the
military and civilian organizations, this increasing involvement of the military has
additionally put aid workers at risk. “The integration of civilian and military efforts is
crucial to successful COIN operations.”64 “Particularly after security has been
achieved, dollars and ballots will have more important effects than bombs and bullets.
This is a time when “money is ammunition.””65 This has brought with it worries of
the safety of aid workers, as in some cases, aid workers associated with coalition
forces have become the targets of insurgent attacks.66 These examples expose the rift
between the development community and government’s commitment to aid
effectiveness. This debate is made more complex as the military has become more
involved in the distribution of aid and has its own COIN objectives to meet.
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COIN
COIN strategy as reflected in the US army manual of 2006 as well as a US
government guide of 2009, developed in response to irregular warfare in Iraq and
Afghan wars, calls for a coordinated relationship between political, economic,
information and security functions.67 At the center of this rethinking is the idea that
soft power and foreign aid will win the battle for hearts and minds and turn the tide of
the war in the United States’ favor. Soft power tactics include diplomacy,
propaganda, and foreign aid to demonstrate social and political values, in order to
persuade indigenous populations to accept the legitimacy of the national government.
David Kilcullen, a former Australian soldier was picked by General David
Petraeus to help author the US Government Counterinsurgency Guide. In his book,
Killcullen argued that there should not be a separation of the military and
development community in COIN because of the fact that development during COIN
is not a typical war. Rather, the aid community is a key player in gaining the trust and
support of the local population.68 Furthermore he argues that aid is the key to
successful COIN because in the end the people are choosing between the government
and or the insurgents and seeking “survival by certainty.”69 In the end, it is human
security that is at the root of what most people strive for in their daily lives.
The history of development aid is one checkered with failures and successes
that have spurred the international community to evaluate best practices in order to
deliver aid in the most effective manner. The COIN missions undertaken in
Afghanistan and Iraq and the recent financial crisis add another dimension to this
debate and warrant further analysis. By taking into account the human security
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paradigm, COIN policies and how aid is distributed, I will be better able to
understand whether coordinated aid distributed at the behest of the military in Iraq
and Afghanistan is more effective than traditional aid distribution.
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Chapter 3 Pros and Cons of Some Coordinated Aid Projects
The use of foreign aid as a tool was seen in the unsuccessful efforts by
the US in the Vietnam War to win over the Vietnamese population. From 1961 to
1968 the United States invested $2.9 billion dollars in foreign aid in South Vietnam,
in attempts to win over the indigenous population.70 In 1967 the US AID budget for
Vietnam totaled more than $550 million. Taken from its total budget that was more
than $2 Billion, this represented a concerted effort by the US Government to garner
indigenous support within Vietnam. The projects spearheaded by the US during this
time were similar in nature to those being implemented in Iraq and Afghanistan,
including schools, hospitals and highways.71 However, because of the failure of the
United States in Vietnam, development aid used for winning hearts and minds in war
should be wielded with caution.
In 2006, the US Army released, for the first time in 20 years, a completely
revised counterinsurgency manual that called for an expanded role in efforts to win
over civilian populations affected by insurgents. General David Petraeus spearheaded
this in reaction to the US Army’s experiences in the Iraq War. What is most
important to take note of in the new COIN manual is that the military has been called
on to take on a non-traditional role that will require adaptation on a level that is
radically different from the conventional training given to soldiers. The foreword to
the manual is the first piece of evidence of the changing role of soldiers. “They must
be prepared to help reestablish institutions and local security forces and assist in
rebuilding infrastructure and basic services.”72 Traditionally, soldiers have been

70

Stephen Biddle, “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon”, in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2 (Mar.-Apr.,
2006), p.3.
71
Marc Leepson. “The Heart and Mind of USAID’s Vietnam Mission”, American Foreign Service
Association, accessed via http://www.afsa.org/fsj/apr00/leepson.cfm.
72
US Army, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24 MCWP 3-33.5 Headquarters of the US Army, December 15,
2006, p. x.

31

deployed in battlefields to fight an enemy. In the introduction to the manual it is
explicitly stated that the objective is “…to secure the safety and support of the local
populace…” as necessary to success.73 The manual goes on to repeatedly emphasize
the role of the soldier in nation building. These objectives are important in that they
allow the US to seem less like an occupying force, and more as a provider of security.
An interagency counterinsurgency guide, similar to that of the US Army’s,
was released by the US government, in concert with several government agencies in
2009. It calls for a more multifaceted operation that utilizes soft power noting, “A
successful COIN operation meets the contested population’s needs to the extent
needed to win popular support, while protecting the population from the insurgents.”74
This represents not only a new strategy in COIN, but also redefines traditional
humanitarian and development aid as a more explicit tool of the US military. With
government agencies including the military becoming involved in administering
foreign aid, traditional agencies, like USAID and NGOs also stand to lose access to
the limited foreign aid that is available. Additionally, traditional standards for how
foreign aid is distributed have changed and have sparked debate within the
development community as to what are best practices.
For the Afghanistan and Iraq War, the U.S has implemented a plan that
utilizes soft power within a COIN strategy as a tactic to defeat insurgencies. In a
speech to NATO forces before he was fired, General Stanley McChrystal, reiterated
the importance of soft power to a successful COIN strategy. “It’s not the number of
people you kill, it’s the number of people you convince. It’s the number of people
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that don’t get killed. It’s the number of houses (that) are not destroyed.”75 The
adoption of soft power by the military presents major challenges to the capabilities of
an institution that trains and deploys soldiers to engage enemies in combat. It begs
the question of whether soldiers are qualified and have the skills to properly carry out
such a mission. In turn, questions about the role of the military and whether they
should be engaged in implementing soft power policies, such as foreign aid, are called
into question.
PRTs
The continuing resilience of and violence perpetuated by insurgencies in both
Afghanistan and Iraq have forced the US government and military to make drastic
changes not only in their military strategy, but also in their relationship with the aid
community. Traditional relationships have been questioned and governments are
struggling to effectively utilize and implement what amounts to billions of dollars
worth of foreign aid through new and untested strategies and programs. This is in the
hopes of building political legitimacy, gaining security and winning the hearts and
minds of the population. These changes have sparked debates as to not only what best
practices are, but also how distribution methods affect the perceptions of donors by
populations living in the conflict zone.
Effectively getting civilians and military units to work together in post conflict
zones has always been one of the main challenges because of the need to adhere to
humanitarian principles. The presence of the insurgencies has magnified this problem
as aid workers have struggled to provide humanitarian and development aid in
conflict zones, while trying not to appear biased towards coalition forces, which
threatens the security of civilians.
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Driving much of the debate about the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq has
been the attempts by the US military to provide aid in insecure areas. While in certain
areas the military may be the only party able to implement aid programs, the general
feeling among aid workers and many government officials is that professionals with
expertise are the preferred party to implement projects. In many zones in which the
military has been working there has been vocal criticism of what is perceived as the
use of aid as a political tool for winning hearts and minds, and a lack of
communication with communities.
The increase in the Department of Defenses’ (DoD) involvement in the Iraqi
and Afghan humanitarian and development missions is evident in the creation of
several programs that have combined military and civilian capabilities. A prime
example of this has been the formation of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRT), which combines “…civilian and military personnel in order to meet stability
objectives in a defined region.”76 The PRTs were a reaction to increasing violence in
Afghanistan and Iraq and the inability to provide humanitarian and development aid
to civilians living in insecure areas. Most NGOs were not able to operate outside of
safe zones protected by coalition forces and the US government recognized the need
to address the lack of aid distribution. The provision of aid also falls in line with the
military’s COIN goal of winning the hearts and minds of civilians.77 In a news
conference, former Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice described the role of the PRT
as crucial to what is known as the “clear, hold and build” strategy. "Our military
operations must be fully supported and integrated with our civilian and diplomatic
efforts across the entire US government to help Iraqis clear, hold and build throughout
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all of Iraq.”78 To many aid workers and policy makers this represented a dangerous
encroachment on humanitarian space and the traditional separation from the military.
Initially formed in Afghanistan in 2004 and later adopted in Iraq, PRTs were
created with the intention of extending the influence of the national governments, and
to encourage NGOs and international actors to focus on development and
reconstruction in rural areas. Their goals included contributing to the reconstruction
process and coordinating with the UN Missions, NGOs and international
organizations.79 In order to undertake the PRT’s mission, the US government had the
massive task of creating a system that recruited qualified civilians to operate in
conflict zones alongside soldiers under extreme conditions. While soldiers are trained
for fighting, their skill sets are not specific to providing humanitarian aid or
implementing long-term development projects. In turn, an aid worker does not have
the same skills as soldiers. The PRT model calls for both parties to carry out tasks
that have historically been exclusive from one another. This gives an idea of the
daunting task that lay before the government.
The actual structure of the PRT, while differing in some respects, follows a
general pattern in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The departments of the government
with representation in the PRTs are the Department of State (DOS), USAID, the DOD
and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). The military objective is
to provide security for the entire PRT in regions that have been identified by the
government as key to stabilization. Meanwhile, the role of civilian aid workers from
USAID is to carry out reconstruction projects, while the DOS oversees the political
and reporting aspects of the projects. What is especially unique is that all parties
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involved, civilian and military, are required to give their approval in order for projects
to move forward.80 This structure demonstrates how interconnected the actors within
the PRTs are and how it has changed the relationship between civilians and soldiers.
Furthermore, their actions are explicitly political in their efforts to defeat
insurgencies. While the PRT Playbook claims that the PRT is not a development
agency, one could claim that is merely semantics. “A PRT stabilizes an area through
its integrated civilian-military focus. It combines the diplomatic, military, and
developmental components of the various agencies involved in the stabilization and
reconstruction effort.”81 Among other things, the goal of the PRT is clearly to provide
development after hostilities.
Central to the success of the PRT mission has been its funding and the ability
to distribute resources in a timely fashion. What has become one of the most useful
sources for funding is the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP).
CERP was created in 2003 by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, in order to
create stability in the field in a timely fashion. According to Mark Martins, “This
Program will enable commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and
reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility, by carrying out
programs that will immediately assist the Iraqi people and support the reconstruction
of Iraq.”82 While originally funded by the Iraqi government with seized funds from
the Ba’athist party, the fund was soon emptied after the war because of the poor Iraqi
oil infrastructure and inability to generate income. This resulted in the US
government supplementing the fund.83 The CERP, which has become one of the
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major resources for the PRTs to fund infrastructure projects, is administered by the
DOD and has played a major role in funding reconstruction in both Afghanistan and
Iraq.
While indispensable in helping provide funds for the PRTs in a timely fashion,
it has at the same time given the military broad powers in making crucial decisions
with little oversight. In the “Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System,”
commanders are encouraged to, “As much as possible, use the existing processes at
the province level (for example, provincial reconstruction development committee
reviews) to obtain local provincial government participation in planning...”84 This has
allowed for the participation of the Iraqi and Afghan government, but at the same time
leaves it in the hands of the commanders to decide when it is “possible” to utilize
government institutions. In a report by the US Government Accountability Office on
Iraq PRTs, members reported that the correct government officials were interviewed
before beginning projects.85 However, reviews of projects found projects that were
unfinished or had not been maintained after the PRT left.86 This highlights the
dangers in projects that are implemented too quickly, and do not have the proper
institutions to support them after the PRT has left. That has resulted in questions of
effectiveness and accountability with respect to projects implemented under the
program.
Iraq PRTs
The insurgency in Iraq arises largely from ethnic tensions, with Sunni
insurgents fearful of a Shi’ite and Kurd government seeking revenge for years of
oppression under Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist party. While security has largely
84
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improved in Iraq in 2011, the insurgency is still operating and is being countered on
all fronts. With violence spiraling out of control in 2004 and 2005, the United States
formed PRTs in Iraq based on those being used in Afghanistan. At this point in time
there was legitimate fear of a civil war breaking out. Furthermore, the killing of aid
workers in Iraq (including the director of CARE’s Iraq office) and Afghanistan had
made working in the countries too unsafe for many NGOs.87 It was the formation of
PRTs that aimed to fill this role of providing much needed aid for civilians living in
areas affected by insurgents. The reaction to PRTs in Iraq has been mixed, with some
groups trumpeting their success and others highly critical.
As of 2010, $154.12 billion had been spent for relief and reconstruction efforts
in Iraq. Of this amount, $56.81 billion had been donated by the United States alone.
In 2004 alone, the US spent almost $20 billion in an effort that was significantly
larger than the similar efforts in Afghanistan.88 As security has improved, the Iraqi
government has begun to take more responsibility for funding their reconstruction
with money from oil revenues and the US donations have decreased significantly.
Table 3.1: US and Iraqi Support for Reconstruction, 2003-2010 $ Billions (%
of combined annual funding)

Source: “Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction,” Quarterly Report to the US Congress, October 30, 2010, p. 24
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However, the sheer amount of money spent in that short period of time justifies a
closer look at the effectiveness of aid distributed during that time period.
Originally civilians from the DOS and USAID ran the PRTs in Iraq and
operated at the provincial level. However, with the “New Way Forward” introduced
by the Bush administration in 2007, utilizing a strategy of 5 core principles to create
stability and self reliance and the troop surge in 2007, there was the creation of what
was known as the embedded PRTs (ePRT), which embedded with Brigade Combat
Teams (BCT) to go into the neighborhoods at the local level in order to provide aid.89
The embedding of the PRTs with the military created a new structure that was largely
ad hoc because of time constraints and the continued insecurity on the ground.
Dealing with soldiers and civilians working closely together on a mission with
differing objectives, many teams were forced to confront issues ranging from
personalities to priorities, which in some cases created tensions and certain levels of
inefficiency. Moreover, at times, because of a lack of training, many of the ePRTs
were not able to hire adequately qualified civilian staff. This resulted in the position
of aid workers being filled by military personnel with little experience.90 As the US
continues their efforts to integrate civilian and military capabilities, the fact that the
PRTs are untested beforehand presents the question of whether they are able to use
aid money in an efficient way. While it is likely that this capacity will improve
overtime, in the meantime filling skilled positions with unqualified military personnel
is bound to result in wasted money, poor delivery of aid and an inability to meet
mission objectives.
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Because of an improving security situation in 2008, PRTs had a stronger
civilian presence than in the past but still struggled in areas of relative insecurity.
Operating in specific areas where the insurgency was the most powerful, the PRTs did
not have as much flexibility to implement projects and instead served more as
advisers to the military. This involved them recommending ways in which projects
could be quickly implemented to win hearts and minds and gain an advantage.
However, these recommendations were beholden to whether commanders felt the
region was secure enough to carry out projects in the manner in which advisors
recommended and could be ignored at anytime.91 This highlights the short-term as
opposed to long-term gains that are at the core of COIN and more importantly the
subordinate relationship the civilian aid PRT members have vis-à-vis the military.
Because the military has so much influence in a PRT, if there is not a good
relationship between the civilian and military branch, the military has the ability to
disregard advice.
The relationship between the actors in PRTs is of utmost importance because
much of the funding culled from the CERP and the aid workers security is dependent
on the cooperation of the military team. The CERP fund has allowed commanders to
have access to grants of up to $500,000 without having to go through the usual
bureaucratic steps. 92 The point of the fund has been to give commanders the ability to
act on projects that require immediate funds. This is a very valuable program, but at
the same time it has created problems within the PRT because commanders, who are
not experts in development, can decide which projects they deem necessary. While
security is of the utmost importance, the ability of aid to be effective is largely
dependent on identifying the needs of the population. If the right projects are not put
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into place the potential for waste increases. Additionally, because the security of the
civilian team is the responsibility of the military, they dictate much of the civilian
team’s movement. A study by the House Armed Services committee found that PRT
members surveyed felt they lacked adequate security some or all of the time they
were deployed. Furthermore, without a military escort they are not able to meet with
people in the communities in which they work. One PRT civilian member described
the importance of being on good terms with the military stating, “If Brigade did not
like you it would have been difficult.”93 This highlights what aid workers sacrifice
when they are embedded with the military. When working independently, their safety
to a large extent, is of their own concern. By embedding with troops in highly
insecure areas, their safety becomes the responsibility of the military and
consequently limits their ability to move freely.
The funding of the PRTs in Iraq also has had a major effect on the US foreign
aid budget and has caused a major shift in funds distributed by the government.
Funding for PRTs is made available through programs like the Quick Response Fund
(QRF) and the Provincial Reconstruction Development Council fund. The QRF was
created in Iraq in 2007 by the DOS in response to the DODs creation of the CERP.
The program allows for the distribution of grants from $25,000 to $500,000 through a
streamlined process for obtaining funds. PRT leaders approve purchases of under
$25,000, resulting in faster approvals of large amounts of money for COIN
objectives.94 While this allowed for more flexibility, it also resulted in cases of fraud
and less of a chance for a bidding process that was most beneficial to the government.
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Part of this is a result of the fact that independent contractors have been hired by the
PRTs because of the lack of security.
Civilian PRTs travel with armed security contingents, which in turn attracts a
great deal of attention. Consequently, often-times unqualified proxies were hired to
do the work of PRT members.95 This is an example of the problems that occur
because of the relationship between the civilian and military arm of the PRT. By
being seen as complying with the military or a political agenda, the civilian actors
become targets themselves. “We can distinguish who is NGO and who is PRT and
we also know that there are civilians in the PRT. They seem to be dangerous and
have hidden agendas. They make us suspicious.”96 The suspicion by the general
population is evidence that the hearts and minds campaign may need to make major
adjustments in order to achieve its goals.
As opposed to NGOs that work as professionals in development and tend to
work in communities for long periods of time and develop close relationships,
contracting firms are present for only as long as the contract and then tend to leave.
This in turn has led to some contractors producing shoddy work and cases of
corruption that leave the community feeling taken advantage of or distrustful of the
government and coalition forces. In one example, the PRTs hired the contracting firm
Development Alternative Inc. (DAI) to disburse grants and purchases. According to a
report, DAI’s charges to USAID appeared to be relatively high, with charges of $.45
of every $1 going to the company. Additionally, the subcontractor was awarded on
average an 8 percent of grant totals for distributing funds. In the end this resulted in
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an average cost of $.61 per $1 of grant money distributed.97 The high cost of
contractors can partly be attributed to the insecure nature of working in conflict zones.
While costs are high, at times, the PRTs are faced with few options of contractors
qualified to implement projects. Testifying in Congress, the Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction acknowledged the problem when asked whether
fraud and waste were present in reconstruction in Iraq:
Regarding waste, yes; regarding fraud, no. The overuse of cost-plus
contracts, high contractor overhead expenses, excessive contractor
award fees, and unacceptable program and project delays all
contributed to a significant waste of taxpayer dollars.98

The hope is that if the US government’s attempt to build the capacity of their
coordinated civilian and military capabilities is successful, this will become less of an
issue in the future.
In 2009, Iraq PRTs submitted reports measuring progress in five different
categories; Governance, Political Development, Economic Development, Rule of Law
and Reconciliation. Looking at the time period from late 2007 to August 2008, the
PRTs reported a significant positive change in all categories.99 In large part, this has
been attributed to the troop surge of late 2007 and puts the PRTs in a positive light.
However, the fact that the analysis was carried out by the PRTs themselves suggests a
conflict of interest. For a more objective analysis, the PRTs need to have outside
firms conducting evaluations to gauge the effectiveness of projects.
While the Iraq PRTs have encountered many challenges in their fight to
provide security against insurgents, they have also had successes in COIN. The
Community Stabilization Program (CSP) was initiated to help Iraqi leaders bring
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stability to communities throughout the country. One of the major problems
contributing to the problem of the insurgency was that of unemployment among
males. Because of the lack of jobs, the insurgency was able to attract Iraqi males to
their cause with promises of wages. Working through the PRTs the CSP helped to
sponsor programs to provide job skills and employment opportunities in insecure
areas. This included more than 54,000 jobs for formerly unemployed Iraqis.100
Furthermore, funds provided by the CSP were used to help complete infrastructure
projects and provide grants for small businesses.101 In this case, the PRT was able to
successfully facilitate the implementation of programs that brought stability to
insecure regions. But more importantly, the work of the PRT helped in achieving the
COIN goals of gaining legitimacy for the Iraqi government.
The PRT’s work with provincial governments helping them create effective
budgets has been especially successful. In helping the government to provide
services, they are achieving the essential COIN goal of the government,
strengthening capacity, and gaining legitimacy. The role of the PRT is to provide
training in the skills that many Iraqi officials lack, such as budgeting and project
management.102 By providing workshops and facilitating meetings, the PRT is able to
interact with the populace and encourage community development of governance and
ownership of projects. Success stories like these clearly demonstrate their ability to
create programs that are successful; however a lack of independent analysis of their
work has limited our understanding of how successful they actually are in
implementing cost effective programs.
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Today in Iraq, the US military has taken a largely behind the scenes
supportive role to the Iraqi security forces as security has slowly improved. As the
US continues to withdraw troops from the country, there has been a movement away
from COIN and more into stabilization efforts. Consequently, the ePRTs are being
phased out and civilians are once again working as advisers within the government.
As the US continues to spend large amounts of aid money in the country to defeat
insurgents, while the deficit increases at home, the evaluation of aid effectiveness has
become all the more crucial. In light of the evidence, it is clear that there are serious
questions as to whether PRTs are as effective as people had hoped and at the least,
suggests that there needs to be changes in the way they are run and the zones of
operation.
Afghanistan PRTs
While the invasion of Afghanistan in 2003 brought the full brunt of the US
military on the country, planning by the US government failed to take into account the
resilience of the Taliban insurgency. Problems were further compounded with the
invasion of Iraq and the subsequent diversion of resources away from Afghanistan.
Today, the US military and coalition forces are approaching the ten year anniversary
since the invasion of Afghanistan and the Taliban still is considered a serious threat to
the security of the country. Operating in Afghanistan and in the autonomous tribal
region of Pakistan, the Taliban has employed guerilla style tactics to destabilize
regions of the country. Meanwhile, there is evidence that they simultaneously operate
a shadow government that collects taxes, appoints officials, operates courts and
threatens to gain the support of people who favor the rough justice of the Taliban, as
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opposed to the corruption of the Hamid Karzai government.103 The inability of the
GoIRA to provide security and good governance, has only further served to embolden
the Taliban and discredit a seemingly inept government.
As the war has dragged on there has been a concerted effort by donors and
recipients to distribute aid in the most effective manner possible. The Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness is especially relevant in that it calls for coordination
between donors and recipients that in some cases has proven elusive in the war in
Afghanistan. Drafted in 2005, the declaration laid out partnership commitments that
included ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results and mutual
accountability.104 While donors have attempted to follow these guidelines, the ability
to adhere, has in large part, been dictated by the security situation in the provinces or
the goals of donor nations. In the case of the Afghan PRTs, they have taken on a
bigger mission that not only aligns civil society, but also gives the military an
expanding role in development initiatives designed to win hearts and minds. As was
the case in Iraq, critics argue that PRTs use of aid to achieve security objectives
violates core humanitarian principles, resulting in failed development projects.
PRTs were originally formed in Afghanistan in response to the continuing
security issues facing the NATO- led International Security Assistance Force. The
original idea of the PRTs, formulated in 2002, was to provide a civil-military force
that combined military, diplomatic and economic functions in order to bring security
and stability to unstable regions.105 Today, the composition of the PRTs is largely
dictated by the security situation in the region in which they are operating.
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Depending on the situation and the country running the PRT, some have more
integrated civilian-military functions, while others are careful to have limited
coordination.
American PRTs work largely independently from other countries along the
insecure Pakistan border. Relatively speaking, they are small with a predominantly
military presence and three or four civilian advisors from the Department of State and
USAID. In 2009, PRTs in Afghanistan had 1021 military staff and 35 civilian staff in
the entire country.106 Similar to PRTs in Iraq, Afghan PRTs have military
commanders that retain final authority, while PRT Civil Command group acts as
advisors.107
The funding of Afghan PRTs is also very similar to that of the Iraq PRTs;
however the amount of money dedicated to Afghanistan is vastly different. With the
invasion of Iraq, much of the US foreign aid budget was diverted away from
Afghanistan. Even with the invasion in 2001, Afghanistan continued to receive less
foreign aid than Palestine, India and China in 2002, and less aid than Iraq, Vietnam
and Tanzania in 2003. However, this changed in 2008 when Afghanistan became the
largest recipient of aid in the entire US budget.108 Of the foreign aid budget for
Afghanistan, GIRoA estimates that $2 billion was used by Afghan PRTs to support
reconstruction, security sector reform and better governance. The GIRoa
Development Assistance Database has tracked $939.2 million in foreign aid that has
been channeled through foreign militaries. However, the Afghan Ministry of Finance
estimates that an estimated $14.9 billion in untracked foreign aid was channeled
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through foreign militaries between 2002 and 2009.109 This is another example of the
significant amount of power that the military has in dictating the foreign aid agenda
and the types of development projects that are pursued.
Clearly, there is an integration between the military and civilian functions, but
the more important question is how effective are they. While each country has
created its own PRT models, adopting the best practices of each has been difficult
because of the restrictions that national politics place on what they are able to do. The
American PRT is focused on Quick Impact Projects in very insecure regions, while
other countries’ PRTs are more focused on long term development projects. In some
PRTs there has been a strong military presence, while in others, their ability to work
with the military is limited. Much of this is related to the security situation in the
places where they are located, but the influence of home country politics is prevalent
as well and influences their ability to function.110 While the PRTs are attempting to
coordinate their civil-military capacity to distribute foreign aid, they are lacking in
their ability to coordinate between PRTs of different countries. This in turn has
created inconsistencies in their success rate.
The actual work that the PRTs have carried out has been widely criticized by
the NGO community. NGOs have been adamant from the beginning in their
opposition to the coordination of civil and military distribution of aid and much of the
work of the PRTs seemed to support their fears. Prior to 2005, the PRTs lacked the
expertise of qualified USAID representatives and consequently their projects were
poorly planned and at times overlapped with the work of NGOs operating in the
region. Often times, in the hopes of winning hearts and minds, they would build
schools in regions with no trained teachers or build hospitals where there were no
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doctors.111 This in turn created resentment from Afghans and aid workers who felt
that in the governments push to win hearts and minds by distributing aid, they were
sabotaging quality work done by NGOs.
The public’s perception of the PRTs plays a major role in gauging their
effectiveness overall. Central to COIN is the mission to inject large amounts of aid in
order to win the hearts and minds of the population. However, the way that PRTs
have utilized aid to accomplish this has been called into question. To the detriment of
some of the PRTs and to many civilians, they are seen as secretive and lacking the
transparency that is present in the work of independent NGOs or those associated with
GoIRA programs. This has created suspicion and a negative perception of the PRTs.
Additionally, because of the overall focus on creating security and meeting political
goals, the PRTs, as opposed to NGOs, are seen as not listening to the needs and
concerns of the population.112
In areas like the Balkh province in the north of Afghanistan, PRTs were seen
as having some success in bringing security, but residents were skeptical as to the
ability of development aid to bring about long-term change. Instead, residents argued
that the real drivers of insecurity were governance, ethnicity and ideology, which
could not be addressed with development projects.113 This suggests that there needs
to be a re-evaluation of where funds are used and more robust oversight into the
effectiveness of these project in achieving COIN objectives. The US has invested
large amounts of development money in the hopes that development will bring
security, when evidence suggests that there may not actually be a strong enough
correlation to warrant this level of investment.
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Regional disparities in funding have also been a major driving force in creating
resentment within Afghanistan. Because of the focus on security and development,
large amounts of aid have been channeled through PRTs in the southern provinces.
(See Map 3.2) On average, Uruzgan and Kandahar received PRT funding of an
average of $150 per person, while Helmand, Paktika and Zabul received an average of
$75 per person. This is in contrast with central and northern provincesthat have been
relatively more secure, like Faryub, Daikundi, and Takhar, which received on average
of less than $30 per person.114 To many Afghans, the concentration of aid in the
violent southern regions seems to reward insecure provinces, while punishing
peaceful provinces in what is referred to as the “peace penalty.” This was summed up
by a group of elders:
We see the situation in Khost, where there is
lots of aid, and wonder if we should try to attract
that with tak o took [a bit of noise]. No attention
is being paid to the peaceful places. Sholgara was
the first place to quit opium cultivation, but we
haven’t received anything. We asked for a tractor
from the Agriculture Department, but we didn’t
get anything.115

Map 3.2 Afghanistan Provinces

Source: Afghan Provinces Map, accessed April 19, 2011 at http://mapprojectionpic.co.cc/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/wpid-
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This highlights the ill effects that aid based on military and political objectives can
have on the efforts made by the government to gain legitimacy. The attempts to bring
security to insecure regions through short-term development seem to have the effect
of actually fueling resentment. Furthermore, disproportionate amounts of aid
funneled to insecure provinces creates the bigger problem of the possibility of
persistent poverty in those provinces that are secure, creating opportunities for
insurgents to take advantage of disenfranchised citizens.116 The frustration of the
Afghans with the PRTs concentration of aid in the south points to the complicated
nature of distributing aid in coordination with the military. (Table 3.3) As aid is
channeled to specific regions of the country to achieve
Table 3.3: Completed, Ongoing, Planned, and Funded PRT Spending Per
Capita, Per Province

Source: Matt Waldman. “Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan,” ACBAR Advocacy Series, March 2008, p.
12.
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military and political goals, the campaign to achieve hearts and minds has been
undermined. The PRTs face a difficult task in walking the fine line between
achieving military and political goals, while meeting the needs of the entire Afghan
population.
Major impediments to the success of the PRTs have also been observed in the
way in which the PRTs are run, resulting in insufficient and poor quality projects. The
short-term deployment of many PRT aid workers has resulted in problems in
implementing successful projects. The length of deployment for PRT aid workers
tends to be one-year contracts, after which they are replaced by new workers. This is
in comparison with NGO employees, who tend to have either been present in
provinces prior to the war or are devoted to longer-term projects. The short length of
PRT worker’s deployment results in a lack of workers with a broad knowledge of the
dynamics of the region in which they are working and forces lessons to be re-learned.
Therefore, there has been a focus on small as opposed to large-scale and long-term
projects, which require more knowledge and organization.117 This means that many
of the major underlying reasons for persistent poverty and insecurity cannot be
properly addressed. Furthermore, the military is faced with the reality that, at times,
their goals do not align with those of the GoIRA or the aid community, forcing them
to make choices that are contrary to the principles laid out in the Paris Declaration on
Aid Effectiveness.118 This has caused tension between the aid community, Afghan
Civilians, GoIRA, and the military.
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Chapter 4 Pros and Cons of Some Independent (Uncoordinated) Aid Projects in
Afghanistan and Iraq
In both post-invasion Afghanistan and Iraq, there is a recognizable need for
both continuing efforts to ensure military security and for reconstruction. In both
countries, massive amounts of aid are being distributed in order to win the hearts and
minds of the population and gain stability, and legitimacy for the central government.
A small percentage of aid can be classified as “uncoordinated” aid, distributed
through three channels: bilateral aid from governments, aid distributed through
multilateral organizations and aid distributed through private NGOs.
Table 4.1: Top 5 recipients of ODA From Donors Reporting to the OECD
DAC, 2001-2009, Constant 2008 Prices, US$ Billion

Source: Lydia Poole. “Afghanistan: Tracking Major Resource Flows 2002-2010,” Development Initiatives, January 2011,
accessed March 24, 2011 at http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/report/afghanistan-tracking-major-resource-flows2002-2010, p. 6.

Today in Afghanistan, foreign aid has become a major component of the
stabilization efforts. According to a recent report by Development Initiatives, from
2002-2009, a total of $26.7 billion dollars was spent on aid initiatives in Afghanistan,
making it one of the top recipients of foreign aid in the world. In 2000, Afghanistan
was ranked 69th in terms of the amount of Official Development Aid (ODA) it
received in comparison with other countries. By 2008, seven years after the invasion,
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Afghanistan was the largest recipient of ODA in the world (Table 3.1).119 While this
is a significant increase in aid, it is significantly less than the actual amount pledged,
amounting to a total of $62 billion by donor nations. This means that donors have
actually only met 43.1 percent of their overall pledges.120 What is more telling is the
amount of aid that is outside of the control of the Government of the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan (GoIRA). It is estimated that 77 percent of aid to Afghanistan is
administered through foreign militaries and outside the control of the government.
This contravenes the principles laid out in the Paris Declaration that call for
ownership and harmonization of aid.121 Of the 23 percent of total aid channeled
through the GoIRA, roughly half is dedicated to priorities of the Afghan National
Development Strategy.122 This points to a trend of Afghans having less control over
their future and leads to a question of whether this is detrimental to strategy. Can
objectives be met with less input from Afghans? Is aid being used to meet the goals
of international donors or those of Afghans?
National Solidarity Program (NSP)
For my first case study of independent aid, I will focus on the National
Solidarity Program (NSP) in Afghanistan. Created in 2003 with the World Bank
Group and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), the goal
of the NSP is to focus on rural areas and “…develop the ability of Afghan
communities to identify, plan, manage and monitor their own development
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projects.”123 In a World Bank Emergency Project Paper on a Proposed Grant to
Afghanistan, the Bank identifies the goal of the NSP as:
“… to strengthen community level governance in Afghanistan and to
improve the access of rural communities to social and productive
infrastructure and services by channeling resources to democraticallyelected Community Development Councils (CDCs) and building the
capacity of CDCs to facilitate community level investments.” 124

These objectives align with those of the US Armies’ “Counterinsurgency” field
manual goal, which identifies political power as the central issue when fighting
insurgencies and therefore argues for building the government’s capacity, and the
people’s confidence in the government to provide services and stability.125 The NSP
does this by building the local rural community’s capacity to elect representatives,
identify community needs and involve a larger cross section of the community in
rebuilding. Currently, 60 percent of the Afghan population is involved some way in
the agriculture sector. Consequently, central government programs that focus on rural
communities are of major importance in gaining the trust of the population. The
NSP’s community- driven approach to development gives the Afghans viable skills
and institutions to sustain themselves, which debunks the insurgents’ argument that
the government cannot provide for the people. It also stands in opposition to the US
governments’ COIN guides goal for a more coordinated approach with the military.
How the NSP is structured is important to its goal of strengthening the
government and empowering the people. Often times, aid programs leave
beneficiaries feeling disenfranchised because of their lack of input in choosing
projects in their communities. This in turn results in projects that do not meet
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community needs. The NSP differs, in that while the development aid to support the
program is provided by the World Bank and other bi-lateral donors, the decisions of
how the aid is spent is largely identified by the community. This requires the
integration of all members in order to be successful. The idea of the community
taking ownership of its own development, which will allow for sustainable growth in
the future, is in line with the aid communities’ recent focus on human security.
The NSP is structured so that the Afghanistan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation
and Development (MRRD) is responsible for distributing aid in the form of small
block grants to rural villages. The villages are eligible for the grants after they have
elected what is known as the Community Development Councils (CDC). The role of
the CDC is to identify the needs of the community with the consultation of an
NGO.126 CDCs are elected by the local community and have been considered largely
successful and accepted within the community because of a rule that requires they
include both men and women. Where as traditional shura ruling councils were all
men, today women members make up 35 percent of the council members.127 This
integration has not only resulted in the empowerment of women, but also more
effective governance because involving women in the decision making process allows
for identifying more of the community’s needs as a whole.
The result of the CDCs has been local Afghan ownership of their future and a
vested interest from the beginning to the end of the project. The way that the NSP is
funded has also played a major role in its success. While the World Bank and other
donors provide funds, the size of the individual grants given to communities is
limited. This means that not only are grants manageable on a smaller scale to meet
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specific village needs, they also reach larger parts of the rural region. Distributed in
what are known as block grants of $200 dollars per family, with a $60,000 limit per
village and an additional 10 percent of the cost contributed through cash and labor,
these are distributed after the Community Development Program (CDP) has
identified, through community input, what is needed.128 Additionally, the program
empowers communities to “…collectively contribute to increased human security.”129
CDCs are unique in that NGOs merely act as Facilitating Partners (FP). The hope is
that by empowering Afghan communities to foster their own development, they are
more likely to achieve human security and become less reliant on foreign aid in the
future.
The administration of the program is what is key to achieving many of its
stated goals. As opposed to many aid programs administered in coordination with the
US military, the NSP operates through the mechanisms of the Afghan government
and input of the local community. As of 2010, the NSP had received $1.1 billion in
funding from the World Bank and bilateral donors.130 The program is funded through
the multilateral World Bank Groups’ International Development Association, which
is comprised of 148 donor countries who contribute aid distributed through the bank
to promote development projects around the world. Through the International
Development Association, the World Bank has contributed $358 million in IDA
grants stages since its first inception in 2003 after the US invasion.131
The overall goal of COIN operations is to win the hearts and minds of the
population by providing security, while at the same time building long-term
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legitimacy for the government. The Coalition forces have attempted to do this
through initiatives like Quick Impact Projects (QIP), a program established in 2003,
which utilize funds from a pool, which commanders can then easily access in order to
fund small, highly visible projects like repairing roads and schools, which in turn are
aimed at achieving stability and legitimacy for the Afghan Government.132 For
instance in 2007, PRTs working in conjunction with USAID representatives, focused
on kinetic regions in the south of Afghanistan, building roads and implementing cash
for work programs to win over the hearts and minds of the local population.133 These
projects are largely focused on regions that lack stability. It is the structure and the
implementation of the NSP and its focus on human security that is the backbone of
the program, that delineates it from QIP. As opposed to QIP, that aim to win hearts
and minds through highly visible projects, NSP projects are based on community
input.
The importance of the whole community’s input cannot be understated.
Development projects do not have an impact unless they meet the real needs of an
entire community. Recently a study was undertaken, with the support of the World
Bank, the Food and Agricultural Organizations of the United Nations and the MRRD
to study the impact of the NSP on Afghan rural communities. This study involved
conducting a baseline survey to compare future findings with. For the study, both
men and women were interviewed as to what they viewed as the top development
priority for their village. Both female and male respondents cited access to clean
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water as the number one priority, followed by schools and hospitals.134 Furthermore,
the baseline survey found that the role of women in the villages was distorted under
the current dominance of the shura council. “92 percent responded that the council or
village leaders had done nothing for women within the past year and 91 percent
responded that there was no formal role by which women could participate in the
village council.”135 Furthermore, the survey showed that women felt that they should
have a role in the council in some form. Seventy percent of women felt females
should have membership in the council and 86 percent felt there should be a separate
council for women. While only 43 percent of men supported women membership in
the council, 85 percent supported a separate female council.136 The baseline survey is
important in that it shows that by forming CDCs, which require female membership,
they are addressing issues of the community at the most basic level of decision
making. As the NSP is implemented by the Afghan government, it aims to build trust
in the central government’s ability to govern. The baseline survey discredits the
Taliban’s argument that the people do not want more rights to be provided for women
or more services. However, cultural norms have played a role in the effectiveness of
the NSP and present challenges to the central governments.
Beginning in 2008 and culminating in 2010, the Feinstein Center at Tufts
University, led by Professor Andrew Wilder, conducted a study on the relationship
between aid and security in Northern Afghanistan, which included an analysis of the
NSP. Perceptions of the NSP were positive in many respects. Respondents favored
the way that funds were distributed because of the fair and democratic nature of the
community electing a council and the council deciding what projects to initiate.
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Furthermore, the NSP is seen as more transparent and less corrupt.137 This was in
contrast to Cash for Work (CFW) programs, which were often times implemented by
commanders, with little oversight or accountability, resulting in nepotism and
resentment.138
Furthermore, the general perception of the NSP in the province compared to
Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which were teams composed of combined civilian
and military personnel tasked with carrying out the COIN objectives and more
specifically development projects to win hearts and minds, was generally positive.
Not only did respondents appreciate the transparency of the NSP, but they also liked
the skills that they gained through working in coordination with the CDCs and
connections made to the government. The success of the NSP was tangible in the
responses analysts obtained from Afghans living in villages where the NSP had not
been implemented. Many respondents had heard of the successes of the NSP and
hoped for the program to be brought to their villages.139 Faryab is a province of
Northern Afghanistan with a primarily Uzbek and Tajik population, along with
smaller percentages of Pashtuns, Turkmen and Hazra.140 While the Farayab province
is less violent than many other provinces, the positive reaction of Afghans to the NSP
speaks to the possibilities of development without linkages to the military.
There is also evidence of a relationship between the NSP and the relative
security that their development projects have produced. The ultimate goal of
insurgents is to win over the general population and gain legitimacy. Because of the
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fact that that the NSP is based on community-driven development and villagers have a
stake in the projects, the Taliban has been more reluctant to attack these projects out
of fear of alienating the population. Gregory Wagner, in an article for the
Washington Monthly, cites a Human Rights Watch survey of Afghan school burnings
that suggests that schools built by the NSP are less likely to be attacked because of the
communities’ stake. Dennis De Tray explains that, “If you're the Taliban, you feel
some comfort in attacking things built by foreigners... But you don't want to create
animosity among citizens you're trying to recruit to your side."141 This relationship
between security and how aid is distributed is important when taking into account the
disproportionate amount of development aid that is distributed in coordination with
the military. In the context of fighting insurgents, it cannot be forgotten that how
development aid is administered is as important as the outcome of that development
aid. COIN campaigns are about perceptions just as much as they are about engaging
the enemy or providing for the people. In the case of Afghanistan, if and when the
people begin to take ownership of their future and also see the government as
facilitating that prosperity, the Taliban is likely to lose legitimacy.
The sheer size of the NSP demonstrates the commitment the Afghan
government has made to community- driven development across the whole of
Afghanistan. Since its inception in 2003, 22,500 CDCs have been established across
all 34 Afghan provinces.142 Evaluations of the NSP program have shown mixed
results in terms of its effectiveness. A major hurdle that the central government of
Afghanistan has had to deal with is the traditional cultural norms that challenge
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central government authority. While villages throughout the country have embraced
CDCs, their ability to displace traditional shura councils has not been as effective. In
many villages, people have embraced the democratic concept and elected leaders that
include women. However, the CDCs have only managed to exist alongside the
shuras, failing to gain more effective authority. It is predominantly the men of the
villages who are more reluctant to cede authority to the central government; trusting
more in elders and the clergy.143 Much of the aid that has been channeled through the
NSP to the villages has been effective in creating positive perceptions of government.
However, villages have still been reluctant to cede authority.
While the NSP has been successful in forming CDCs and gaining rights for
women in the councils, the effectiveness of development projects has been
questioned. NSP development projects have addressed village needs for clean water
and electricity, but they have failed to show improvement in economic activity or
access to infrastructure.144 The lack of improvement in economic welfare is very
worrisome to the NSP project. Because of the nature of insurgencies, the more
immediate the results, the more the chances are that the insurgents will not be able to
gain legitimacy. While there are many different factors that create economic growth,
stability and good governance, time is not on the side of those conducting COIN. It is
not only the results relative to the Afghan people that are worrisome. As the war
drags on, the will of the American public has begun to wane and questions of the
feasibility of success have risen, leading to calls for withdrawal. Consequently, time
is of the essence.
The Tufts University study also hi-lighted many of the challenges that the
NSP faces in Afghanistan. For some Afghans, the NSP program presents
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opportunities for some at the expense of others. Like the Afghan Central government,
the CDC has not been immune to major bouts of corruption. Many Afghans see the
NSP as bringing corruption to a local level because of the amount of money that has
been made available to corrupt and powerful figures.145 In some cases, commanders
or village elders have co-opted the CDC for their own purposes, causing resentment
throughout the community. In Sholgara District of Karab Province, located in
Northern Afghanistan, a CDC chief was ousted after having submitted fake bills,
stealing furniture meant for the meeting house and funneling benefits to his own
family.146 At times CDCs were even controlled from the outside by influential
members of the community, creating resentment amongst community members. FPs
have not been spared accusations of misusing block grants, which has made
maintaining legitimacy and working partnerships more difficult.147 Fortunately, the
democratic process of the CDCs has mitigated many of these problems.
The success of NSP has to be viewed in relation to other projects operating in
Afghanistan and the context of the Afghan situation. The program is operating in a
conflict environment in which the country’s civil service system and infrastructure
have largely been destroyed. Because the judicial system and security are weak, it is
reasonable to expect that some forms of corruption will exist. However, the reactions
of the community have been largely positive when compared to other programs
operating in the region. Afghans have largely embraced the democratic principles of
the CDCs and the concept of having a stake in choosing and implementing
development projects. Furthermore, the defense of these projects by the Afghans and
the reluctance on the part of the Taliban to commit acts of sabotage relating to NSP
projects speaks volumes to the importance of community driven projects. The general
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positive feedback about the program from the government, villagers and international
donors, reported by the Tufts University Feinstein International Center, signals a
chance to duplicate aspects in other provinces. As the COIN mission advances, it is
important to study programs like the NSP in order to gain knowledge of best
practices.
Norwegian PRT Model
Much of the debate regarding the use of coordinated foreign aid is in response
to major programs that were initiated by the US military in response to deteriorating
security situations. In both Iraq and Afghanistan the US military created what are
known as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which are designed to incorporate
both military and civilian capabilities into one unit that can provide both security and
development in insecure zones, in an effort to win hearts and minds. This has
garnered much attention in the international development community because the
method of combining civil and military capabilities has called into question whether it
meets ethical standards and if it is effective.
The case of the Norwegian PRT operating in Faryab province of Afghanistan
represents an interesting case study that demonstrates the use of methods that are not
common to the PRTs and could offer some insight into best practices. As Faryab is
primarily Uzbek and Tajik population, along with smaller percentages of Turkmen
and Hazra148 and as the Taliban are predominantly Pashtun, their presence in the
province has not been as strong, resulting in a relatively more stable security situation
than that of other provinces. The question is whether this relatively secure situation
can be related to the Norwegian PRT methods and if they are winning over the
Afghan population away from the Taliban Insurgency.
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Based on studies of British and Irish PRTs, Afghans found that often times
PRTs were not as responsive to their needs because of the complicated relationship
that they had relating to their structure, security and mission. Many respondents
found that while the PRTs attempted to communicate with the villagers, the tendency
to repeat the same mistakes gave people the impression that PRT members were
going through the motions, rather than genuinely responding to needs.149 By focusing
on winning the hearts and minds of the population, rather than presenting long-term
solutions, the PRTs were further disenfranchising the population. For some, the
ability of the PRTs to implement projects was lacking all together. “Development
projects are beyond their [PRT] capacity and do not help them in winning hearts and
minds either. They have only succeeded in creating publicity for themselves. Now
many people know who they are and how much resources they have.”150 In
Afghanistan, because of the insurgents’ tactics of trying to discredit the government
and occupying forces, publicity is often the last thing that groups want.
What sets the Norwegian PRT apart from others is its insistence on drawing a
line between the mission of the military and that of development. While the military
branch in the US PRTs is active in development projects, this is not the case in the
Norwegian model. In a joint statement, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Defense and Ministry of Justice and Police stated that, “The main
aim of the Norwegian engagement in Afghanistan is to support the Afghan authorities
in their responsibility to ensure stability, security and development.”151 While these
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goals are intertwined in many respects, the way that they are implemented is an
important distinction.
In theory, the Norwegian government utilizes what is called the integrated or
whole of government approach to carrying out their mission. The integrated approach
is based on the premise that security, governance and development cannot be
achieved without coordination between all sectors.152 However, when examined more
closely the Norwegian approach for meeting their goals has not fully applied this
theory and has differed significantly from the common US PRT operating in
Afghanistan. While embracing the idea of the integrated approach, the Norwegians
interpret this as meaning that, “The respective roles of the Norwegian civilian and
military actors shall be clearly distinguished, and the coordination between all actors
shall be strengthened and their efforts made coherent. The civilian component shall
therefore be drawn out of the PRT and linked more closely to the local authorities and
to the UN (UNAMA) as soon as the security situation permits.”153 This implies
instead that the civilian sector is to work more in coordination with the Afghan
government rather than the military. However, there is still debate today within
Norwegian society as to the proper relationship between the military and civilian
coordination when distributing aid.
Many leaders within the military establishment have embraced the idea of the
military as a distributor of aid or collaborator with the aid community. After a
campaign in the village of Ghormach, Badghis Province, the military advocated for an
influx of development aid, which would help to secure and win the hearts and minds
of the population. However, the Norwegian NGO community was less enthusiastic
about the idea of inserting themselves into a situation where the safety of workers
152
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would be an issue.154 At the crux of the argument is whether the Norwegian
integrated approach will bring about visible benefits. As opposed to the US COIN
strategy, which calls for winning hearts and minds through quick win projects the
Norwegian strategy envisions long term and sustainable projects as more effective in
creating legitimacy for the government and helping the population.
Norwegian NGOs have argued that attempting to achieve short-term security
goals instead of pursuing a long-term strategy of development puts Afghans at risk
because of the implications of benefiting from the military action. If communities are
seen as benefiting from the work of military development projects, they may be seen
as colluding with foreign occupiers. Therefore, they argue, NGOs that maintain their
impartiality are most qualified to provide aid.155 Without maintaining these standards
the NGOs stand to be viewed as another part of the military and as having ulterior
motives. The Norwegian government has continued to support NGOs, which
continue to operate separately from the military.
The PRT has two pillars: one military and one civilian. The
two components are separated in terms of mandate and employees,
however close cooperation and multidisciplinarity is a key to success
including respect for each other’s competences. The task of the
military part of the PRT is, as part of the ISAF (International Security
Assistance Force) operation, to promote a good security environment
in the Faryab province and to facilitate development and
reconstruction. The civilian component consists of police liaison
officers, prison officers and civilian advisors, including a development
and political advisor.156

This has allowed the Norwegian aid community to operate and be viewed as more
impartial providers of aid. Recent studies by the Norwegian Government, The
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and The Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, while not conclusive, have indicated that the Norwegian Model
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deserves closer analysis because of its strengths in providing aid and Afghan
perceptions of the PRT.
The ability of the Norwegians to adequately provide quality aid projects to
Faryab province has been helped by their willingness to coordinate with the Afghan
institutions. As opposed to PRTs run by other countries, the Norwegian PRT has
rejected the use of Quick Impact Projects (QIP) and projects run through Civil
Military Cooperation (CIMIC). These QIP and CIMIC projects are designed to win
hearts and minds, with funds provided by the military as opposed to the Ministry of
foreign affairs.157 The explicit military and political goals of these programs have
caused critics to question their impact, effectiveness and the security effects on the
communities receiving the aid. Furthermore these types of projects blur the
traditional rules of aid distribution based on providing aid to mitigate the impacts of
war. In contrast, the Norwegian PRT has embraced a different strategy based on
Afghan priorities and needs as opposed to the political and security needs of the
military.
PRT Meymaneh (Capital of Faryab province) is based on a model
which entails that the PRT does not implement development projects
of its own. Instead, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo and the
Norwegian Embassy in Kabul channel funds to programmes in Faryab,
which are implemented through the World Bank, United Nations and
NGOs. These programmes are chosen according to Afghan national
priorities and the recommendations of the PRT. 158

Not only does this meet the needs of the Afghan population, but it also allows the
PRT to keep a lower profile while at the same time fulfilling its mission to provide
assistance and support to the Afghan government.
The tactic of utilizing the Afghan government to distribute aid has worked for
the Norwegians in many respects. To begin with, many NGOs and contractors have
garnered bad reputations in Afghanistan. The amount of money pumped into
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Afghanistan since the invasion has made the country a hotbed for NGOs and
contractors helping to implement programs and projects of all sizes. Unfortunately,
because of the sheer size of the aid packages and the pressure to spend money
quickly, these programs have often been beset by problems. Furthermore, the quality
of some organizations operating in Afghanistan has been criticized. Perceptions of
contractors, NGOs and PRTs have been mixed as many have been viewed as greedy
and corrupt. Given that the goal of COIN is to win the hearts and minds of the
population, some view the reputations of actors as a detriment to the overall mission.
A recent study sponsored by the European Network of NGOs in Afghanistan (ENNA)
and the British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) found that a lack of
communication between actors and the population was a major factor in causing
negative perceptions of development projects.
The Norwegian PRT has attempted to address some of the concerns expressed
above by clearly delineating civilian and military functions. The results have been
positive when juxtaposed against reactions to other PRTs. In the Feinstein Center
study of Faryab province the general reaction towards the PRT was relatively
positive. While the population is aware of the presence of the Norwegian PRT, and
the fact that they are a major donor for the region, the perception of the team is
generally positive.159 Many PRTs in other provinces are seen as a liability that can
possibly bring more violence to the region. In the case of the Norwegian PRT, it
appears in some instances that rather than seeing them as the reason for insecurity,
some respondents equate them with providing aid. One villager responded, “We are
happy with the Norwegian PRT, although they cannot guarantee security in the whole
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province because they don’t know the area. But they do provide a lot of aid.”160 The
analysis and positive reviews of the Norwegian PRTs seems somewhat to support the
arguments against aid distribution through the military. Receivers of aid are aware of
the intentions of aid distribution and channeling it through the military apparatus
seems to give it a negative perception. By utilizing GoIRA institutions, the Afghan
people are empowered and the Norwegian PRTs are able to make a difference without
being viewed as an entity working to achieve military objectives
Aga Khan Development Network
As opposed to aid distributed through the military, many NGOs in
Afghanistan have been operating in Afghanistan and distributing aid for an extended
period of time and in turn have developed relationships with the communities in
which they work.
The Aga Khan Development Network is a prime example of an organization
that has long-term ties within communities and has in turn utilized these ties to
promote meaningful and sustainable development. Furthermore, the cultural ties that
the organization shares with the communities they work in have further created trust
that makes legitimacy possible. For all people, an understanding of their needs comes
not merely from an influx of money. Rather, an understanding of cultural context and
customs when implementing development projects is as important and a much more
effective way of conveying sincerity and winning the hearts and minds of a
population.
The Aga Khan Development Network, founded and chaired by Aga Khan,
who is the leader and 49th hereditary Imam of the Shia Ismali Muslims and has
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worked in this capacity for over 50 years.161 While the network is a nondenominational organization, it does follow the ethical principles of Islam,
“…particularly consultation, solidarity with those less fortunate, self reliance and
human dignity…”162 In many ways this is important to its success in that the ISAF is
seen as occupiers or having ulterior motives for being in the country and not being
Muslim. In the words of a tribal leader, “It would be a bit difficult for the PRT or the
military to achieve winning hearts and minds because people still look at them
suspiciously as foreigners. It would be good if Islamic countries replaced them and
started talking to the Taliban.”163 This demonstrates the negative feelings towards
ISAF that still persist today and calls into question the notion that by simply
providing aid, the population will support you. In reality, the population is aware of
some parts of the ISAF mission, while at the same time misinformed by the Taliban
propaganda about others. By utilizing as many GoIRA institutions, Muslim NGOs or
independent NGOs, the insurgency has a more difficult time convincing civilians that
the ISAF is benefiting from occupation or programs do not have their best interests at
heart.
The Aga Khan Development Network also has built a relationship with
communities it has worked in over time. The group began work in Afghanistan in
1995, distributing Humanitarian aid in the northeast of the country and has developed
trust within communities from this relationship built through the years. 164 Today
they are involved in social, cultural and economic development throughout the
country and currently act as a facilitating partner in the GoIRA NSP program and also
in promoting small business enterprise in the Afghan community.
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As an FP for the NSP the Aga Khan is an ideal partner because of its previous
experience with communities in Afghanistan and affiliation with Islam.
It is in its role as an FP that the organization is able to use its knowledge of the
community in order to more adequately facilitate development projects. In testimony
before the Wartime Contracting Commission, Anne C. Richard of the International
Rescue Committee testified to the importance of the relationship and genuine
partnership between communities and facilitating partners. In the Afghan NSP
program the FPs are NGOs as opposed to outside contractors.
NGOs have in-depth knowledge of the communities we serve. We
often arrive in these countries before we are awarded grants and stay
when that grant is over. Because of our long-term approach, our staff
has extensive knowledge of the communities in which we work. This
knowledge is built over years of earning trust, ensuring community
involvement in decision making, and promoting a greater sense of
ownership.165

In contrast, private contractors carry out many of the projects developed through aid
distributed by the US military, without ties to the community. While the NGO FPs
are paid a fee for their work, because as NGOs they often times promote social causes
they have the ability to donate their own funds to causes they feel are worthy. In the
case of the Aga Khan Development Network, during a project to bring electricity to
the Uland and Khushpak villages, the price of the project cost more than the grant that
the villager had received. However, the Aga Khan Development Network was able to
supplement the rest of the project with additional funds of $13,000.166 With outside
contractors as facilitating partners for these projects, the extra money necessary to
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continue the project would not have been available. Furthermore, outside contractors
have little vested interest in the community besides getting paid for the project.
Oxfam in Iraq
As the debate continues as to what kind of aid should be distributed and how,
Oxfam has argued since the beginning of the war that the focus on development
projects to win hearts and minds of the population in COIN is the wrong tactic. As
Iraqis have struggled with humanitarian crises the differences between the amount of
humanitarian and development assistance given has been significant. Table 3.1 shows
the decrease in humanitarian assistance from more than $862 million in 2003 all the
way to $95 million in 2006. This is in comparison $1.2 billion in development aid in
2003, which then increased to $18 billion in 2006.167 As the security situation has
stabilized relatively, the amount of humanitarian aid has decreased, but the gulf
between humanitarian and development aid still exists as humanitarian crises persist.
In 2009 Iraq received $497 million dollars in humanitarian aid compared to $2.9
billion in development aid.168
Table 4.2 Emergency Humanitarian Assistance and ODA to Iraq from DAC
donors 2003-2006 ($millions)
2003
2004
2005
2006
Emergency
Humanitarian
assistance from
DAC donors
Assistance for
Development Only

862.48

875.09

453.43

95

1,232.50

3,518.73

20,948.64

18,010.10

Source: Mary Kirkbride, Michael Bailey, Manal Omar, p. 24.

Additionally, the formation of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program
(CERP) by the US congress is intended to provide funds to commanders in need of
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urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs. Congress has consequently
provided funds of $854 million in 2005 and $500 million in 2006 and 2007.169 While
this shows the commitment of the US military to provide humanitarian aid, it is also
bound to draw criticism from aid workers as to what are the intentions of the military
implementing development projects in regions that are still dealing with humanitarian
crises, in what some would argue is a case of putting the cart before the horse.
Defense secretary Robert Gates hoped for the US government to permanently increase
the military’s overall capabilities in “long-term reconstruction, development and
governance.”170 What does this mean for the future of humanitarian principles? Is the
government and military, in distributing aid, focusing too much on meeting political
goals as opposed to meeting the basic needs of those experiencing humanitarian
crises? While political calculations are always a factor in aid distribution, many
organizations see the military further expanding their role, especially under the
pretense of COIN, as further threatening aid workers and their ability to deliver
effective aid.171
Oxfam has argued that under international law, the Iraqi people have a right to
assistance and protection based on traditional humanitarian principles of aid
distribution, but in the Coalition forces’ efforts to win hearts and minds, immediate
humanitarian needs are being neglected in favor of development projects and political
goals. Two years after the start of the Iraq war the World Food Program in Iraq
released a study that showed the malnutrition rate in Iraq to be 26% of the

169

Nina M. Serafino. “The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major
Issues, and Options for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, December 9, 2008, p. 7.
170
Nina Serafino, p. 5.
171
Matt Waldman. “Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan,” ACBAR Advocacy Series,
March 2008, p. 13.

74

population.172 This is evidence of a major humanitarian crisis, yet, as illustrated in
table 3.2, humanitarian aid continued to decrease from 2003 to 2006 in favor of
development assistance. Furthermore, there needs to be more of a focus on providing
humanitarian aid without discrimination because civilians suffer “…from a denial of
fundamental human rights in the form of chronic poverty, malnutrition, illness, lack of
access to basic services, and destruction of homes, vital facilities, and infrastructure,
as well as injury and death.”173 This disturbing situation of extreme violence has
resulted from, in large part, a myriad of problems related to insurgents, sectarian
violence and general power struggles.
After the beginning of the war in Iraq the security situation was so unstable
that many organizations were not able to reach communities in need and deliver
assistance in non-combat zones. Furthermore, they feared that the US government
would use the opportunity to distribute humanitarian aid as a chance to portray
themselves as liberators, violating the rules of impartiality and neutrality.174 In a
briefing paper Oxfam International argues that civilian actors are the most qualified to
administer humanitarian aid whenever possible. Citing the 2001 Draft Oslo
Guidelines, the authors say that it “…establishes that military and civilian-defense
capabilities are a means of last resort in responding to the needs of civilians in an
emergency.”175 Furthermore, the paper argues that there needs to be less of a focus on
Quick Impact Projects and more of a focus on cost effective aid administered by UN
aid agencies and other organizations.176 Without the proper skill sets and qualified
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administrators, aid is bound to be spent inefficiently and cause resentment and
confusion about who is an aid worker, and consequently cause more suffering within
the population.
The continued insecurity within Iraq has resulted in the exodus of international
NGOs from the country because of an inability to guarantee the safety of employees.
This has been compounded by many NGO’s adherence to traditional humanitarian
principles and refusal to accept funds from countries involved in the war out of fear of
being perceived as impartial.177 Therefore, they argue that the military must maintain
its neutrality and role as provider of security.
In spite of all of the factors that have limited, on many levels, NGOs’ ability to
function within the country, it has not fully diminished their ability to still provide
some assistance that adheres to humanitarian principles and is less influenced by
COIN objectives. Currently, while not operating in Iraq because of security concerns,
Oxfam International operates from offices in Jordan by partnering with Iraqi
organizations still functioning within the country. So bad was the security situation
beginning in 2003 that the organization has been forced to hide their affiliation with
Iraqi NGOs out of fear for the Iraqis’ safety.178 In July 2007 Oxfam argued for a
return to traditional humanitarian principles, highlighting some of the NGOs they
anonymously worked with and the work that they had achieved. These included
organizations that provided healthcare to more than 100,000 Iraqis, the prepositioning of medical supplies in potential conflict zones and food and water to
internally displaced people throughout the country, even with limited funds.179
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Oxfam has also been able to provide assistance in Iraq by serving on the NGO
coordinating committee for Iraq.180
Limits placed on Oxfam are evident when viewing their work in comparison
to their activities in other regions. Oxfam and other organizations have been excluded
from participation in Iraq for reasons including their commitments to certain
standards of operation and security concerns. As COIN continues, NGOs have been
forced to adapt to the environment and in many cases this has meant taking a lesser
public role. Recent studies identified what was described as a toxic environment for
aid workers.181 What was left of a visible aid and humanitarian mission in 2007 was
one largely connected to the military and carried with it a lot of baggage regarding
politics and neutrality. This highlights the need for better communication or
coordination in some fashion between NGOs and the military. Coalition military
forces continue to provide humanitarian aid, yet insecurity persists in many regions of
the country. Differences in the amount of funding for development projects versus
humanitarian related projects, combined with the continuing human security threats to
the Iraqi population are significant and deserve more attention.
As the military continues to develop their capacity to provide development
and humanitarian aid, the recognition of the importance of civilian actors must be
kept at the center of the debate. Former Secretary of State Robert Gates highlighted
this when he pointed out that aid distributed by the military “is no replacement for
civilian involvement and expertise.”182 However, this will require dialogue between
both sides and a common understanding of the roles of each party.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion
The attacks of September 11, 2001 changed the paradigm that the world
operated in and the repercussions from this event still resonate today. Stemming from
those attacks, the US has justified engagement in two wars, costing billions of dollars
and countless soldier and civilian lives on both sides. According to a 2011 report,
since the 9/11 attacks, the United States has spent $806 billion in Iraq, $444 billion in
Afghanistan, $29 billion in enhanced base security and $5 billion in unallocated
funds, for a total of $1.283 trillion.183 The global financial crisis of 2008 has further
compounded the mounting debt that the US has accrued to the point of threatening its
financial future and those countries dependent on trade with the US. Ironically, as
America battles terrorism, insurgencies and financial meltdowns, in a speech on
Aljazeera TV, Osama Bin Laden stated that one of the tactics of al Qaida was
“continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy.” 184 With the
US debt at $14 trillion in 2011 and the country forced to make serious decisions about
its economic future, all forms of spending should be scrutinized for effectiveness and
foreign aid will be held to the same standard.
I hypothesized that the traditional relationship between aid workers and the
military in the distribution of foreign aid in COIN operations is inadequate and
dysfunctional. Furthermore, I argued that while both parties are important vehicles in
the distribution of aid, because of the lack of coordination between them, COIN has
been much less effective. Therefore, my thesis studied the ways in which aid is
distributed by aid workers and the military, in order to uncover evidence to support
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my thesis and draw conclusions as to what are the best practices in aid distribution,
when dealing with insurgencies and winning hearts and minds.
However, my research has revealed evidence that does not fully support my
hypothesis. Debate around the use of foreign aid in COIN has centered on whether it
violates humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality. In the past NGO
coordination with the government or military has largely been discouraged and been
considered a conflict of interest in their ability to deliver aid effectively. However,
this conflict of interest seems to be more of a grey area than it initially appears and
organizations seem to have drawn different distinctions as to what this actually
means. Many NGOs that strive to maintain impartiality are funded and entirely
independent of any government programs. However, others still receive funds from
government organizations like USAID and are said to be impartial. The fact is that
offices like USAID are part of the government; they fund militaries, and are to some
degree political because of their affiliation. The attempt to distinguish between
governments and the militaries they fund seems to represent a problem for NGOs
considering the obvious relationship between them. Again, those organizations that
work to promote programs like the NSP are involved in initiatives that are inherently
political in their goals of creating a stronger civil society that is affiliated with the
GoIRA. Furthermore, many NGOs are working to promote institutions and ideals
that go against the very core ideals of the insurgent groups. This then begs the
question of whether their claims of impartiality and neutrality are legitimate. This is
important as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq continue into their tenth year and the
struggle to defeat the insurgents appears in many respects to be making little
headway.
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This is not to say that there are not degrees of impartiality that can be
identified when distributing aid. It is clear that embedding civilians within PRTs is
not an ideal model because of the impression that it gives to civilians of the military
being a chief provider of aid. Additionally, the problem of the blurring of identities of
aid workers and soldiers makes it more difficult for civilians to make the distinction
between their roles. In Afghanistan and Iraq this has created considerable problems
as PRT associated projects have become targets for insurgents, based on military and
political associations.
Unfortunately, in certain areas in which COIN is being carried out, insecurity
is extremely high and the military is the only possible provider of aid available. In
these situations alone the PRTs stand to serve a useful function in providing basic
humanitarian aid, with the help of aid workers, for suffering civilians. As was shown
in the earlier research, the militaries capacity to deliver development aid has not
reached a level in which effective projects can be achieved through the PRTs in
highly insecure regions. Instead, the focus on quick impact projects to win hearts and
minds has created resentment among the population because of the poor work of
contractors with no permanent stake in the region and a lack of quality control related
to projects.
Part of the reason that PRTs have experiences failure is related to the problems
that are encountered when trying to achieve development objectives in insecure areas.
Because of their focus on security, soldiers are not able to fully utilize the skills of
civilian aid workers and are forced to pick and choose the advice that works in the
given security situation. This makes for incomplete and inefficient programs and
implementation. By focusing on gaining security and providing humanitarian aid the
military will be more able to competently coordinate with the aid community in tasks
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that it has trained for and performed well in the past. Furthermore, the military and
aid workers projects will be less of a target because they are focusing on less high
profile projects. Quick impact projects can be of short-term benefit, but if
implemented poorly, they stand to impede the COIN objective of winning hearts and
minds.
In areas that are more secure, civil/military separation stands to serve the
population best and achieve COIN objectives. The Norwegian model demonstrates
how the separation of functions best delineates the relationship between civilians, aid
workers and military. Furthermore, civilian aid workers are the most qualified to
implement projects by helping to promoting community driven development that
allows civilians to choose projects that meet their needs. It is most important for aid
workers to encourage ownership of projects in the community by channeling them
through government institutions. Ownership encourages citizens to defend projects
from insurgent attacks in the future and helps the government gain legitimacy as
catalysts of change.
In response to the failure of development aid in the past, recipient countries
have advocated for reforms in aid disbursement in post-conflict and fragile states that
can be applied to both Iraq and Afghanistan. In December 2010, on the sidelines of
the OECD International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in Dili, TimorLeste, conflict affected and fragile states met to share lessons learned in an attempt to
decide the future of development in their countries. Out of this meeting the g7+
(Afghanistan is a member) was formed, the Dili Declaration was drafted, and the g7+
statement was agreed upon, which called members to “reduce poverty, deter conflicts
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and provide better conditions for our people.”185 Subsequent work of the g7+ has
resulted in what is known as the “New Deal”, which was adopted by the international
community at the Fourth High Level on Aid Effectiveness in Busan South Korea in
November 2011.
Currently, as can be seen by the different methods of engagement by different
country’s PRTs, there is a lack of coordination on the part of the international
community in their efforts to defeat the insurgencies using foreign aid. The New Deal
builds on experiences of fragile states to guide donor engagement in fragile states.
Central to the New Deal is a focus on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs),
that call for, among other things, legitimate politics that “foster inclusive political
settlements and conflict resolution” and security.186 Additionally, the new deal calls
for countries to “FOCUS on new ways of engaging, to support inclusive country-led
and country-owned transitions out of fragility…” and ”TRUST by providing aid and
managing resources more effectively and aligning these resources for results.”187 The
New Deal principles, most importantly country led development, will undercut the
insurgents claims of international interference and will allow the aid community to
have more separation from the military. While security in certain regions is still a
major issue, the New Deal’s focus on peacebuilding and statebuilding allow for
fragile states like Iraq and Afghanistan to have the necessary institutions to counter
the insurgencies arguments against ineffective government and gain legitimacy.
As the US winds down its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, defeat of
insurgents is perhaps the most important objective to an overall successful mission.
Not only will failure damage American prestige, but it could also stand to embolden
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insurgencies and terrorist networks throughout the region. As can be seen in Iraq
after the recent troop withdrawals, weak state institutions and renewed sectarian
violence are threatening the future of the entire country.188 The Norwegian PRTs
separating military and aid workers and support of local governance has reaped
benefits for the entire community, which appears to be sustainable and equitable. By
maintaining humanitarian space for aid workers, continuing the traditional separation
between civilians and the military, except in only the most insecure situations, and
adopting the principles of the New Deal, the COIN operation stands to achieve its
primary goals.
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